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ABSTRACT
The current refugee crisis has created an influx of refugees, primarily in the developing
world, which has caused an issue of burden-sharing amongst the global North and South.
Some states are hindered in their capacity to offer assistance and protection while other
states avoid participating in the refugee realm all together. Repatriation remains the only
solution for the majority of refugees and can occur after residing for short or long periods
of time in the host country. Voluntary repatriation is a key element to the foundation of
international refugee law. The concept‟s basis lies in the notion of “voluntariness”
resulting in its promotion as the ideal solution to solve refugee problems. The current
criteria for the promotion of repatriation programs, as outlined by UNHCR and
monitored by states, are based solely on their objective perspectives. The failure to
include the subjective perspective of the refugee undermines voluntary repatriation not
only of its voluntary nature but also as a durable solution. The decision to voluntarily
repatriate should be based on the refugees‟ own criteria, not those which are dictated by
states and other stakeholders. The absence of the refugee perspective has led to the
present day situation in which states interpret refugee law for themselves, using acts of
coercion, persuasion, encouragement and other methods to force refugees home under the
auspices of voluntary repatriation. The designation of such objectivity as the primary
decision-making factor in refugee protection has led to the erosion of the entire
international refugee law regime.
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“You see, refugees are just like you and me. Except for one thing. Everything they once had has been left
behind. Home, family, possessions, all gone. They have nothing. And nothing is all they‟ll ever have
unless we extend a helping hand.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
The current discourse in international refugee law revolves around the common
viewpoint that refugee law is “not in firm commitments to durable refugee protection.”2
This stems from the argument that the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and 1967 Protocol3 and refugee law norms are rooted in the post-WWII and Cold War era
and are no longer relevant to the causes for refugee protection today. 4 Some posit that
the refugee regime is in “crisis”5 while others affirm the need to “acknowledge the
distinction between legal standards and policy recommendations” because we cannot
make states “respect norms that they have not accepted.”6 General observations of
international refugee law conclude that it is “increasingly not respected”7 and that the
current practice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees‟ (UNHCR)
maintenance of refugee protection “cannot substitute for effective action, political will
and full cooperation on the part of States”8 since refugee protection is state responsibility.
According to UNHCR, in 2009 there were over 16 million refugees with more
than 26 million displaced individuals.9 The number of protracted refugee situations

1

As quoted by UNHCR in Nezvat Soguk, States and Strangers; Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft,
28 (University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
2
Michael Barutciski, Involuntary Repatriation when Refugee Protection is no Longer Necessary: Moving
Forward after the 48th Session of the Executive Committee, 10 INT‟L J. REFUGEE L. 252 (1998).
3
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter 1951 Convention] at art. 33 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
606 U.N.T.S. 267.
4
supra note 2.
5
James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, Making International Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for
Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J., 115 (1997).
6
supra note 2 at 253.
7
Id. at 238.
8
[hereinafter UNHCR]. Para. (d) “emphasizes that refugee protection is primarily the responsibility of
States, and that UNHCR's mandated role in this regard cannot substitute for effective action, political will,
and full cooperation on the part of States, including host States and countries of origin, as well as other
international organizations, and the international community as a whole,” as described in UNHCR
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 81 (XLVIII), 48 th Sess., UN doc. A/AC.96/895, 20 Oct. 1997,
9
UNHCR, UNHCR Annual Report Shows 42 Million People Uprooted Worldwide, (16 June 2009)
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4a2fd52412d.html.
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across the globe increased from 22 in 1999 to 30 in 2008.10 The majority of refugees
originate from the developing world.

The majority of states hosting large refugee

populations are located in the developing world. Between the years of 1997-2001 these
countries hosted more than 66% of the individuals of concern to UNHCR.11

It is

primarily these developing countries that use their fears of national security issues as a
justification to involuntarily repatriate refugees.12 They also blame the heavy burden that
flows of refugee populations place on their local resources and the high costs of
providing aid and protection. Unfortunately, solidarity efforts between states and the
international community to address these problems have thus far proved to be fairly
ineffective.13 There has been a recent shift in focus from examining the consequences of
conflict to analyzing the root causes so that “international refugee protection can be
reconceived to minimize conflict with the legitimate migration control objectives of
states, and dependably and equitably to share responsibilities and burdens.”14 While the
direction in which international refugee law is heading remains uncertain, it is important
to maintain focus on its intent: to respect state sovereignty while affording protection to
the persecuted.
Upon arrival, refugees are often treated as “others” in the host society; they are
strangers, unequal to their host counterpart, never fully able to cross the threshold of
acceptance. Their only hope lies with UNHCR‟s “durable solutions:” resettlement to a
third country, integration within the host country or repatriation to country of origin.15
Unfortunately, resettlement is considered a conservative solution afforded to few, leaving
repatriation and integration as the only reality for most refugees. However, as host states

10

Samuel K. M. Agblorti, Refugee integration in Ghana: The Host Community‟s Perspective, 1 (UNHCR
New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 203, 2001).
11
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of
Concern, (May 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4124b6a04.html.
12
The more recent trend of mass influxes causes a great deal of concern due to the mix of individuals which
are included in these groups: asylum-seekers who are protected under the 1951 Convention, others in need
of international protection as well as those who fall within the Convention‟s exclusion clauses.
13
These include: collectivized administration, operational burden sharing, responsibility sharing and
repatriation and development assistance as described in Hathaway et al., supra note 5 at 145.
14
Id. at 118.
15
The UN Refugee Agency, Durable Solutions, UNHCR, (2010), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cf8.html.
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often implement laws and policies to mitigate challenges16 posed by refugees, integration
is a nearly impossible solution as it fails to bestow rights equal to those of citizens of the
asylum state and path to citizenship. Governments often use refugees as scapegoats for
economic and social hardships as well as crimes (theft, prostitution and illegal trading
across borders) which leaves the host environment hostile in the reception of refugees in
their communities.17 Thus, repatriation is often perceived as the only viable option, and
the most preferred solution, when the circumstances in the home country have improved
significantly. Although, it too possesses various challenges and risks.
The UNHCR Executive Committee‟s Conclusion No. 74 recognizes that it is
essential for rehabilitation, reconstruction and national reconciliation to be addressed in
both a comprehensive and effective manner if repatriation is to be a sustainable and thus
truly durable solution to refugee problems.18 While UNHCR‟s handbook, Voluntary
Repatriation: International Protection, states that “repatriation which is voluntary is far
more likely to be lasting and sustainable,”19 states continue to divert from the
“voluntariness” character of the principle of voluntary repatriation.

Voluntary

repatriation is not legally-binding as “it does not represent a universal obligation that
States have actually assumed,”20 rather it is a policy recommendation derived “from the
text of the UNHCR Statute, not from the Refugee Convention which binds States.”21
States have thus “mistakenly felt free to impose sometimes sweeping restrictions on

16

These challenges are often perceived to be social, economic and political.
Gaim Kibreab, Revisiting the Debate on People, Place, Identity and Displacement, 12 J. REFUGEE STUD.
400 (1999).
18
Executive Committee, Sess. 55th, Conclusion 74 (XLV) on Legal Safety Issues in the Context of Voluntary
Repatriation of Refugees, (2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/417527674.html.
19
“Reaffirming that voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement are the traditional solutions for
refugees, and that all remain viable and important responses to refugee situations; reiterating that voluntary
repatriation, where and when feasible, remains the preferred solution in the majority of refugee situations;
and noting that a combination of solutions, taking into account the specific circumstances of each refugee
situation, can help achieve lasting solutions, Reaffirming the voluntary character of refugee repatriation,
which involves the individual making a free and informed choice through, inter alia, the availability of
complete, accurate and objective information on the situation in the country of origin; and stressing the
need for voluntary repatriation to occur in and to conditions of safety and dignity.” Id.
20
Barutciski, supra note 2 at 250.
21
James C. Hathaway, The Rights of States to Repatriate Former Refugees, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
189 (2005).
17
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freedom of movement, access to employment and other protected interest and left to their
devices to decide how refugee repatriation should be structured.”22
According to the 1951 Convention‟s Article 33, refugees are defined as ex
definitio or unrepatriable persons; this prohibits states from forcibly returning refugees,
otherwise known as refoulement.23 Through the recognition of the principle of nonrefoulement in international customary law, all countries are bound, regardless of
ratification status, to this principle.24 It is only with the implementation of one of the
1951 Convention‟s cessation clauses that refugees lose their protection but until then they
“are entitled to benefit from dignified rights-regarding protection until and unless
conditions in the State of origin permit repatriation without the risk of persecution.”25
Therefore, if the situation is not covered by a cessation clause, return cannot be forced by
the state.26
In 2008, after almost two decades, the Ghanaian government determined the
conditions in Liberia suitable enough for Liberian refugees in the Buduburam Refugee
Settlement to return home. This decision was relayed to the refugees through a camp
invasion by Ghanaian forces, resulting in the detainment of hundreds of women and men,
physical and verbal abuse and in some cases, deportation. The tension and fears that
enveloped the camp led many Liberian refugees to register with UNHCR‟s voluntary
repatriation program. Narratives conducted during a two-week time period in Monrovia,
Liberia elaborate on the situation of the camp at the time and the experiences of eleven
former refugees. Their stories illustrate that while they may not have been ready to return
to Liberia they felt as though they were left with no other choice but to voluntarily
repatriate as they feared their lives were in greater danger if they remained in Ghana.
The voluntary nature of repatriation is established as “an inherent safeguard
against forced return.”27 However, currently no real requirements or measurements exist
to determine the degree of “voluntariness” of repatriation because of the inability to
22

James C. Hathaway, Meaning of Repatriation, 9 INT‟L J. REFUGEE L. 554 (1997).
1951 Convention, supra note 3.
24
L. Catherine Currie, The Vanishing Hmong: Forced Repatriation to an Uncertain Future, 34 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. 340 (2008).
25
supra note 22 at 551.
26
Barutciski, supra note 2 at 249.
27
G.S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 274(Oxford University Press 1996).
23

4

determine whether or not a return is truly based on an individual‟s own self-will to
voluntarily repatriate. Once the host state concludes that there have been significant
improvements then it is within its right to eliminate refugee status.28 However, many of
these circumstances and decisions are based on the objective perspectives of the state and
do not reflect the refugees‟ subjective perspectives or their notion of “home.” Refugees
have their own voice and often their own set of criteria for return which are not reflected
in that outlined by UNHCR and host states. The absence of fora for refugees to voice
their concerns and opinions frequently results in their hesitation or resistance when faced
with the decision to repatriate. Such reluctance, along with a state‟s unwillingness to host
refugees for short or even long periods of time, often leads to harassment, discrimination,
refoulement and acts of encouragement or persuasion by government officials to “push”
refugees to return to their countries of origin. As state attitudes shift in refugee law,
authorities have begun to rely solely on objective factors, rather than a combination of
both the subjective and objective perspective, deeply crippling the principle of voluntary
repatriation. This paper asserts that while repatriation is based on its “voluntariness,”
host states‟ objective perceptions commonly result in the forcible return of refugees to
their home states under the guise of voluntary repatriation.
Part I presents the history of durable solutions and the legal framework of
voluntary repatriation including the role of UNHCR in the implementation of this
solution.

It identifies and examines the difficulties and challenges of voluntary

repatriation in refugee law. Part II analyzes the subjective and objective perspectives of
international refugee law to elucidate the state‟s ability to create higher and lower
thresholds of requirements, reflective of these perspectives, in order to abstain from or
evade refugee protection. Part III offers a brief background on Liberia‟s history, its civil
conflicts and the situation in the Buduburam refugee settlement for Liberian refugees.
This section also discusses the events which led up to the mass repatriation program in
April 2008.

Narratives are then provided to offer agency to the refuge voice, by

illustrating the refugees‟ subjective perspective of life in Ghana. Through state practice it

28

B.S. Chimni, From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable
Solutions to Refugee Problems, 7 (UNHCR News in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 2, 2004).

5

is evident that these voices are ignored in current policies. Their stories and experiences
exemplify the necessity to include such perspectives in policy-making if repatriation is to
remain a durable solution.

Part IV offers some suggested policy changes and

recommendations for all stakeholders in the refugee field to consider before promoting
repatriation programs.

They also address some of the gaps within the concept of

voluntary repatriation and the entire realm of refugee law.

Part V summarizes the

problems with voluntary repatriation, its “incoherence as a legal standard”29 in today‟s
world, and the inability for refugee law to continue in its current state if it is to realize its
fundamental purpose.

29

Barutscki, supra note 2 at 249.
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II. REPATRIATION AS A DURABLE SOLUTION
A. History of Durable Solutions
The concept of durable solutions was first introduced in the post-WWII era to
address the mass numbers of refugees in Europe. From 1945 to 1985, resettlement was
the most promoted solution in practice to address the needs of refugees across the globe
even though repatriation was viewed as the preferred solution.30 It was only at the
beginning of the Cold War era that the right for an individual “to flee from political
persecution and to choose where he or she wanted to live was recognized.”31
It was not until the late 1980s that states began to actively promote voluntary
repatriation as the response to solve the increasing global refugee problem. In 1983,
voluntary repatriation officially acquired an „absolute character‟ through those
resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly which focused specifically on
refugees.32 The 1990s was declared the “decade of voluntary repatriation” due to the
increase of civil conflicts in Southeast Asia and Africa. During this time, voluntary
repatriation became “the durable solution, with an emphasis on ensuring the voluntary
character of repatriation.”33

Whilst voluntary repatriation has remained the durable

solution ever since, it is the one in which the UNHCR, states and the international
community have had “the greatest limitations of mandate, influence, time and
resources.”34
B. The Legal Framework of Voluntary Repatriation
1. The Legal Language
In international human rights law, the principle of voluntary repatriation is the
basic right to return to one‟s own country.35 During the period in which the 1951
30

supra note 28 at 1.
Id. at 3.
32
Id. at 2.
33
Id. at 1.
34
Id. at 2.
35
UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation and International Protection, Sec. 2.1. (1996).
31
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Convention was drafted, refugee law was “firmly wedded to an exilic bias”36 and thus the
idea of repatriation as being of a voluntary nature was obsolete in the language of the
1951 Convention. Since the concept of “voluntariness” did not make it into the legal
framework of refugee protection the task of ensuring state adherence to the idea was
assigned to the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the predecessor to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). When the IRO dismantled and
UNHCR was formed, the concept of voluntary repatriation was the main principle
outlined in its mandate. The preamble of this statute also called upon states to assist the
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees to promote the voluntary repatriation of
refugees.37
The General Assembly‟s Resolution 428(V) of 14 December 1950, adopting the
UNHCR Statute, requests governments to cooperate with the High Commissioner by
assisting in efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees. 38

Voluntary

repatriation should be facilitated by “providing for the protection of refugees by assisting
governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation as a solution:”39



Repatriation should be voluntary.
UNHCR, governments and private organizations (NGOs) have a joint role
to play in voluntary repatriations.
 Voluntary repatriations should be both facilitated and promoted.40
It was not until thirty years later that the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner‟s Programme closely examined voluntary repatriation for the first time.
Their analysis resulted in the drafting of Conclusion 18 (XXXI) which states the
desirability for UNHCR to be involved in the process of repatriation. Conclusion 18 both
consents to and outlines the primary role of UNHCR in regards to voluntary repatriation:
to maintain the voluntary character of repatriation, assist and cooperate with governments
in the facilitation of those refugees who wish to repatriate, to provide guarantees by the
country of origin, to monitor the country of origin and any substantial changes that may

36

Chimni, supra note 28.
Id. at 6.
38
UNHCR, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, General Assembly
Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950, available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c39e1.html.
39
Id. at Par. 8(c).
40
supra note 35 at Sec. 1.1.
37
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be fundamental to the well-being of refugees, advise refugees on the conditions of the
home country and the guarantees that have been laid out, and to receive, monitor and
assist returnees in their reintegration in the country of origin.41
Five years later, the Executive Committee re-examined voluntary repatriation and
adopted Conclusion 40 (XXXVI) which reiterated the basic doctrine of protection for
refugees and principles for the promotion of voluntary repatriation.

Conclusion 40

further instilled the important role that UNHCR plays in refugee situations and the need
for unhindered access, in both the state of origin and the state of asylum, to the
populations of concern. Other important points which stemmed from this included: to
maintain “the possibility of repatriation „under active review‟ from the outset of a refugee
situation” and to pursue the promotion, when appropriate, of a solution.42 From this,
UNHCR‟s mandate expanded to include the assistance in reintegration and rehabilitation
of returnees and to act as a mediator and promote dialogue between all stakeholders.
Conclusion 40 also emphasizes the continual need for repatriation to remain of a
voluntary character under conditions of absolute safety and dignity.
UNHCR‟s Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation confirms that in order for safe
repatriation to exist three requirements must be satisfied: safety guaranteed by the law,
physical safety and material security.43 The former two are usually “easier” to ensure
while the latter is nearly impossible and is also one of the factors which hampers the
promotion and facilitation of repatriation. Material security includes access to land and
opportunities to acquire and sustain a livelihood. Many countries of origin have engaged
in years of armed conflict, thus resulting in the destruction of a majority of the
infrastructure. These states face difficulties providing basic services, lack progress in
development, and educational and employment opportunities for returnees. Security
concerns are also an apprehension for many refugees when considering a return home. 44
It is difficult to promote repatriation when these still unstable countries are at risk of

41

Executive Committee 31st session, U.N.G.A., No. 18 (XXXI), 1980.
Executive Committee 36th session, U.N.G.A. No. 40 (XXXVI), Oct. 1985.
43
Frederiek De Vlaming, Guidelines for NGOs in Relation to Government Repatriation Projects, 11 J. OF
REFUGEE STUD. 184 (1998).
44
UNHCR, supra note 11.
42
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renewed violence or are unable to provide basic services and methods of incomegenerating support to returnees.
2. UNHCR’s Role in Voluntary Repatriation
The primary responsibility for managing refugee crises lies in the hands of states
who must work together to provide effective protection and standards of safety for all
refugees. States must cooperate with each other and form partnerships to devise both
legal and practical measures when responding to refugee situations until appropriate and
sustainable solutions can be found. Unfortunately, this is not often the case and UNHCR
has thus needed to step in to fill the gaps where states have been unwilling to fill.
UNHCR has the responsibility to ensure that the conditions in the country of origin have
improved to guarantee the safe and dignified return of refugees and to guarantee that they
do not feel compelled to return.
The role UNHCR plays in repatriation programs depends upon the extent of
involvement that the government of asylum is willing to offer. UNHCR can actively
promote and/or facilitate voluntary repatriation. “A body of leges speciales constituted
by numerous bilateral and tripartite agreements”45 between UNHCR, the country of
origin and the country of asylum are established to control the method of refugee return.
While these agreements emphasize the voluntary nature of repatriation and for the return
to be conducted safely and in a dignified fashion, they are not always detailed in aspects
specific to the given group of refugees and the transition from host to home state. The
safety, security and dignity of the refugee population reside in the hands of the host
government until they are no longer in their territory. Upon entering the country of origin
the protection of refugees is then transferred to the home country, releasing the host
government of any further involvement or responsibility. While the country of origin
must then step in, often times these states are unable or unwilling to commit to the
reintegration of the returnees. The increasing need for UNHCR to play a participatory
role in these various stages of reintegration, rehabilitation and reconciliation has

45

Chimni, supra note 28 at 10.
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diminished its capacity to fulfill its core mandate.46 Its mandate was not created for nor
is it suitable “for engaging in the tasks which would need to be implemented to ensure the
requisite re-establishment.”47 In other cases, UNHCR must “strike a delicate balance
between fulfilling its protection and solutions mandate without seriously compromising
basic protection tenets, including those which frame”48 voluntary repatriation as a durable
solution.
3. The Repatriation Criteria
UNHCR‟s mandate outlines four conditions that must be examined before the
consideration of repatriation: fundamental change in circumstances, voluntary nature of
the decision to return, tripartite agreements between the state of origin, the state of
asylum and UNHCR, and the ability to return in safety and with dignity with unhindered
access by UNHCR upon their return.49 While these are all considered to be standard
criterion they cannot be preconditioned. Disturbingly, the current criteria lacks a viable
method to determine how many conditions must be fulfilled and the threshold that must
be met in order to be considered a safe and sustainable return and thus a durable solution.
UNHCR‟s role, with respect to seeking durable solutions
notably voluntary repatriation, is far from a mere tangential
one. Apart from the fact that its mandate ratione personae
is more encompassing than the scope rationae personae of
the 1951 Convention, UNHCR often actually implements
this particular solution, especially in the case of operations
that are promoted rather than facilitated.50
The current trend of normalizing voluntary repatriation by UNHCR has left some
to believe that it is more of a political tool, dominated by mostly western states and their

46

Robyn Lui, World Order and UNHCR‟s “Comprehensive” Approach to Refugees, 14REV. QUEBECOISE
112 (2001). See also UNHCR, supra note 11; “Enabling refugees to regain their homes
and land, through fair and effective property restitution mechanisms, is often a related challenge, in which
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needs, rather than a humanitarian agency.51 Others claim that its current role as a key
provider of refugee protection is inadequate and palliative and that repatriation must
reflect the refugees‟ own subjective criteria with a decision which is made at their own
pace of comprehension and consideration.52 Its function as a humanitarian agency to
ensure solutions are durable and to offer adequate protection has shifted from a focus on
protection to the process of return, including the stages of reintegration, reconstruction
and reconciliation. UNHCR‟s focus of voluntary repatriation as the durable solution
threatens the principle of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum because it creates
a situation where states avoid refugee situations or deter from human rights and refugee
law obligations because of their unwillingness to host refugees for long periods of time.
It also diminishes the demands for resettlement in third countries. This both instills and
confirms the “belief” that voluntary repatriation is the only viable solution, reaffirms that
resettlement is nearly impossible and reintegration is unrealistic. Refugees are then faced
with the decision to return “home” or to be stuck in an eternal state of limbo.
4. The 1951 Convention’s Ceased Circumstances
The 1951 Convention‟s Article 1(C) expresses six conditions from which refugee
status ceases.53

The most widely recognized of these six, as being applicable to a

majority of refugee situations, is Article 1(C)(5):54 “He can no longer, because the
circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased
51

supra note 49.
supra note 46 at 95.
53
“(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or (2) Having
lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or (3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys
the protection of the country of his new nationality; or (4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the
country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or (5) He can no longer,
because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to
exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; Provided that
this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A(1) of this article who is able to invoke
compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the
country of nationality; (6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the
country of his former habitual residence.” The 1951 Convention, supra note 3 at art. 1(C).
54
To date there have only been fifteen cases resulting in the application of formal cessation within the past
twenty years. However, the application did not stem from the 1951 Convention‟s article 1(C) but rather
from the UNHCR Statute. Joan Fitzpatrick, The End of Protection: Legal Standards for Cessation of
Refugee Status and Withdrawal of Temporary Protection, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 377 (1999).
52

12

to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his
nationality.”55 In cases where refugee status is considered no longer applicable, the
change in circumstances must be fundamental, stable, durable and effective.56
This principle of special circumstances is further reiterated in the United Nations
Executive Committee‟s Conclusion 69 which affirms the right of refugees to be granted
reconsideration, on an individual basis, before the cessation clause applies to them, to
ensure that no one continues to possess a well-founded fear before being forced to return
home.57 The clause would also not necessarily apply to those who have “strong family,
social and economic links to the state of refuge.”58 In the case of African refugees, the
cessation clause can be invoked from either the 1951 Convention or the 1969
Organization of African Unity‟s Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa.59
In order for the cessation clause to be invoked there must be a fundamental
political change which must be “truly effective,” durable and long-lasting, rather than
temporary.60 The current system does not provide a method to measure the changes of
state conditions in order to determine whether they are fundamental and stable. There is
also no way of ensuring that these changes are relative to invoking the cessation clause.
These are all ambiguous factors in refugee law policies and areas of great concern which
55
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have yet to be fully addressed. The 1951 Convention provides little guidance on how to
determine whether or not the risks of persecution and the foundation for well-founded
fear have been eliminated or reduced to a level which would justify return.
Unfortunately, the current practice of invoking the cessation clause is through the host
state‟s objective perspective of these change in circumstances to decide if the changes
would validate return and does not include the a subjective perspective of the affected
refugee.
C. Voluntary Repatriation in Practice

In order to address state concerns for national security there has been a demand to
examine the root causes of conflicts with the aim of determining the generating factors of
refugees rather than the consequences. This shift in focus away from possible solutions
has added to the erosion of the durable solutions‟ foundation as the current norm is to
promote voluntary repatriation as the only solution, under conditions which may or may
not be voluntary. This is also a challenge because the “insistence on voluntariness as the
only acceptable guarantee that return does not amount to refoulement is likely to simply
fortify the resolve” 61 of states to avoid aiding refugees in the first place. While there is a
need to look at refugee crises beyond just being a humanitarian issue, to include a
political response and solution,62 we cannot move so far beyond it that states no longer
adhere to human rights obligations and deter from providing refugee protection.
Voluntary repatriation is an integral part of international refugee law, especially
since it is considered the durable solution for refugee situations. The nature of voluntary
repatriation as a durable solution relies on the principle that refugees are not only able to
return but are also able to re-establish themselves in their home country.63 The process of
repatriation is divided into three distinct phases: 1) the preparation of refugees to leave
the state of asylum to return to their country of origin, 2) the actual process of repatriation
and the act of reception in the home state and 3) the reintegration process that occurs in
61
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the home state. All three steps are fundamental to the overall success of voluntary
repatriation. It is important that these phases and refugee law policies are implemented
according to basic human rights principles and standards to maintain the effectiveness
and durability of voluntary repatriation as a permanent solution. The failure to do so in
any one of the steps could result in disastrous effects as it is the refugees‟ lives at stake.
As observed, the objective of the voluntary repatriation framework clearly extends
beyond the assistance of UNHCR and can only be realized through the cooperation and
cohesive efforts between the countries of origin and asylum and UNHCR.
Since its inception UNHCR has looked for ways to ensure that refugees return
home under durable conditions in order to prevent them from returning only to be forced
to flee once again. However, the failure of states to share in the “burden” that refugee
influxes place on the countries of asylum seldom allows for refugees to return under such
idyllic conditions. The inability of states of the geographic South to host refugees in the
long-term has led states to impose return on refugees in order to ease their economic,
political and social burdens. The unwillingness of Northern states to share this burden
further adds to the demise of refugee protection. Nowadays, voluntary repatriation has
become a priority for states, not because it is regarded as the best of the durable solutions,
but because states of asylum do not allow refugees to remain in their territory on a
permanent basis.64
In practice, the voluntary nature of repatriation scarcely exists because there are
no other viable options but repatriation for the large majority of refugees. When a
refugee crisis shows no sign of abating, there is a lack of encouragement by the host state
to integrate and resettlement is rarely offered as a realistic solution. Refugees are left
with no other choice but to return, and therefore repatriation fails to be an absolute
durable solution based on an absolutely voluntary nature.65 In addition, the failure to
recognize that there is no mention of “voluntariness” in the 1951 Convention, but rather
only mentioned in UNHCR‟s Statute, only further discourages states from adhering to the
principle of voluntary repatriation since one cannot “superimpose” this principle on an
64
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international Convention. Furthermore, one also cannot “superimpose” such a principle
on states that may have ratified the 1951 Convention but yet have no legal obligations to
the UNHCR Statute. 66
In some instances, UNHCR may implement and facilitate repatriation programs
“when the life or physical integrity of refugees in the country of asylum is threatened to
the point that return is the safer option.”67 Such deterioration of conditions in the host
country includes assault on the physical security of refugees: acts of physical attacks and
rapes, harassment, arbitrary detainment, extortion and increasing xenophobia in the
countries of asylum.68 Refugees who do not choose to repatriate “voluntarily” face
forced deportation – refoulement- or are left to languish indefinitely in camps where they
have to struggle to survive or live indefinitely on the assistance of handouts. In many
cases, because the situations are often so dangerous and the availability of protection and
aid are inadequate, refugees have preferred returning home, regardless of whether or not
it is safe, rather than to languish in the host state.69
It is important to note that, in the African context, the 1969 OAU Convention also
affirms the right to repatriate on a voluntary basis. Article 5 of the Convention outlines
five conditions to guarantee the voluntary nature of repatriation.70 These conditions not
only illustrate the rights of the refugee but also the obligations of the African state to
guarantee voluntary return.

Unfortunately, with the crises that currently plague the
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continent consisting of primarily developing states, voluntary return is more the
exception rather than the norm in Africa.
1. Important Factors Often Never Considered
The pressure from states to repatriate refugees causes voluntary repatriation to be
promoted out of context, campaigned as a “social and spatial phenomenon” rather than a
legally durable solution.71 In pursuance of releasing states from the burden of aiding and
assisting large and/or protracted refugee situations, UNHCR‟s current strategy to promote
repatriation, through the creation of idealized images of home to compel refugees to
return, delegitimizes the voluntary nature of voluntary repatriation.72 In addition, many
advocates of this durable solution have, over the years, assumed that all refugees long to
return home and thus fail to give authority to the refugee voice. It is important to
consider the following points before the promotion of repatriation programs:
1. Passage of time: Most importantly, second generation refugees do not
want to return to a home that they do not know and of which they have no
memories.73
2. The effects of spending years in exile profoundly affects refugees that
home is nothing more than a place of nostalgia.74
3. “A gendered view of exile and return contested the „cozy image of home‟
projected by advocates of repatriation.”75
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Refugees may be reluctant to return home for a variety of reasons. Some may
eventually, after witnessing the return of friends and family members and receiving news
of improved conditions from returnees, be more inclined to return. For others, the idea of
returning home is more an impossibility than a reality due to the failure of aid
organizations and home and asylum states to recognize and consider the psychological
issues that one may relate to “home” as a result of past traumatic events. There are also
social aspects which often fail to be accounted for such as the natural tendency for
refugees to develop ties to the community where they reside and to create a new life for
themselves after the traumatic events that they have endured.76
It is important for states to acknowledge that if refugees return on a less than
voluntary basis there is a significant risk that they are returning to areas which are „illprepared or incapable” of receiving them.77 There is also the danger that the countries of
origin will be less than interested in their return and will thus put little effort into the
facilitation of their re-integration. Repatriation does not end when a refugee returns to
the state but rather when here is successful reintegration into the home state as
reintegration is “the anchor of repatriation.”78

Refugees may find themselves in

conditions worse than that in which they found themselves in the host state, if their return
is premature. To force these individuals to return home compromises not only their
dignity and safety but also the refugee protection system as a whole. It is also important
to recognize that “home” for refugees is no more than a legal fiction as the majority of
returnees will be unable to return “home” and instead will just re-enter their country of
origin.79
2. Other Challenges
Refugees are entitled to certain rights and protection as stated in the 1951
Convention. At the same time, however, as a human being they are also entitled to
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specific human rights, as detailed in other documents such as the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). The ICCPR offers asylum-seekers and refugees rights such as
the right to self-determination and the right to pursue economic, social and cultural
development.80 The UDHR affords them the right to both seek asylum and return to their
country of origin, the right to nationality, the right to life, liberty and security of person,
the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile and the
right to freedom of movement.81 The UDHR also outlines specific rights, as would be
applicable to returnees in their state of origin, such as the right to work, to education,
health care, social security and other social benefits.82 The 1951 Convention entitles
refugees specifically to the rights to obtain employment and access to public elementary
education.83 Regrettably, many of these rights are not granted to refugees during their
stay in the country of refuge.

Current state practice clearly demonstrates that

“humanitarian factors do not shape the refugee policies of the dominant states in the
international system.”84
An additional issue of concern relates to the fact that refugees, especially those in
protracted situations, often rely solely on humanitarian assistance. To confine refugees to
humanitarian assistance as the only means of survival deprives them of the opportunities
to become educated or work in order to acquire skills, improve their situation and to
create more self-dependency.

This deprivation of self-reliance prevents them from

participating in income-generating opportunities, “from developing their human potential
and limits their ability to systematically make a positive contribution to the economy and
80
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society of the asylum country.”85 By maintaining refugees as passive recipients their
lives will remain idle and in perpetual conditions of despair. “Training and education are
important factors in providing repatriates with realistic prospects for the future in the
receiving country.”86 The failure of states of asylum to recognize this only aids in
prolonging the stay of refugees in their territory. When the situation does arise for return
there can be both psychosocial and economical reasons for their decision to remain and
even hesitation or skepticism.
When repatriation programs are promoted refugees should be allowed sufficient
time to prepare for their return. The current trend of expedited “removal” threatens the
integrity of repatriation programs.

The state of origin and asylum, along with the

assistance of UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies, should offer practical assistance
and access to resources and information. They should be well-informed of the conditions
of their home country and the situation that they will find themselves in upon their
arrival. Refugees should receive psychological treatment both prior to and after the
return to their country of origin in order to facilitate an easier transition from living in
exile to returning to their place of origin.
3. The Need for Re-evaluation
It is apparent that there is an urgency to re-examine the legal language and
framework of the 1951 Convention and UNHCR‟s Statute to determine how such
language can be interpreted. For example, if UNHCR‟s mandate is to promote and
facilitate repatriation when does the promotion end and facilitation begin? 87

No

guidelines or regulations exist to differentiate between encouragement, promotion and
facilitation. The lack of burden-sharing between the geographic North and South has left
the “burden” of refugee crises largely to the Southern states to endure. How long must
they be willing to provide and protect refugees if they are already facing their own
problems? If stakeholders wish to transfer efforts in humanitarian assistance to looking
at more preventative protection, how does this actually happen and what happens to the
85
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refugee populations and their human rights? How do global bodies act prior to the
escalation of situations which will result in refugees and will it really make any
difference if we can foresee such conflicts? Again, these questions illustrate the need to
re-examine the 1951 Convention and modify it to reflect the current situation of refugee
problems and attempt to diminish these gaps.
The current detriment to the principle of refugee protection is the notion that
involuntary repatriation can occur under a variety of auspices of voluntary repatriation.
In due time, “involuntary repatriation will become the norm” and acts such as
“promotion, facilitation and encouragement will, despite the best intentions of UNHCR,
be interpreted by governments to suit their narrow interests.”88 The improvement of
home conditions should not be used as an excuse to coerce refugees to return to their
country of origin and to the situations from which they fled in the first place.89 Voluntary
repatriation cannot be considered voluntary when refugees are deprived of their basic
rights to life and freedom through outright acts of persuasion, coercion or other forceful
measures from the government. These acts and measures by states often include limiting
aid and assistance, encouraging anti-refugee sentiment and behavior from nationals as
well as relocating refugees to unsympathetic communities or remote locations, far from
access to services.90 The less room allowed for states to interpret refugee law to suit their
own needs and interests the better it will be for the refugees and the refugee system, with
a greater possibility to attain a truly sustainable and durable solution. The UNHCR has
already concluded that repatriation is extremely difficult to implement and that “a
successful and relatively problem-free return is more often the exception rather than the
rule.”91
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A crucial factor which still needs to be considered is that substantial political
changes do not necessarily mean that a return to the home state can be considered safe.
Currently, however, the majority of refugees are “voluntarily” repatriating based on the
argument that the political change is enough to advocate for return. Are the current
standards truly reflective of human rights norms? For example, can repatriation occur
when the judicial system does not meet international minimum standards thus allowing
criminals who committed war crimes to go unpunished? Can a country be considered
relatively safe for return and how does one measure or determine this?

More

importantly, is a country relatively safe enough for return when the state of refuge is no
longer tolerant of the refugees‟ presence?92
Most often, voluntary repatriation “operates within a highly politically-charged
environment” which leads states to commit various pressures or acts of coercion in order
to facilitate the refugees‟ return.93 The motivation for these pressures are often due to the
economical, social and even sometimes political costs of hosting large refugee
populations and/or hosting for extended periods of time. If voluntary repatriation is to
remain a durable solution then a normative framework for state responsibilities and
clearer refugee law standards must be established. The lack of burden-sharing amongst
states and inability to offer durable solutions to protracted refugee situations has led
many states to revert away from not only refugee law instruments but also human rights
standards and principles.
D. Conclusion
UNHCR‟s 1997 The State of the World‟s Refugees states, “A large proportion of
returnees have repatriated „under some form of duress‟.”94 As this chapter has revealed
the current blurring of distinction between acts of refoulement and voluntary repatriation
is destabilizing not only the possible durable solutions to refugee situations but also
international refugee law. The absence of guidelines to illustrate which acts of pressure,
92
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coercion, suggestions, encouragement, persuasion and inducement are acceptable and
unacceptable and legal and illegal as well as a legal framework for repatriation has left
states to act according to their own free will. The shift from UNHCR‟s non-political
identity to one which very much maintains a political character has further allowed states
to derogate from the 1951 Convention‟s Principle of Refoulement and taint the integrity
of voluntary repatriation. If states are allowed to continue on this committed path of
implementing defensive strategies and policies “designed to avoid international legal
responsibility toward involuntary migrants”95 then we need to look at changing the
traditional approach of voluntary repatriation. We must move away from the decrepit
1950s refugee law framework to one which reflects the modern-day refugee with a focus
on the current gaps in the refugee regime, including clear and realistic guidelines and
protocols for voluntary repatriation with a larger focus on the needs of returning refugees.
When acts of repatriation occur as a result of a fundamental and durable change and is
conducted on a wholly voluntary basis then the lives of returnees may improve
substantially however this self-determined act is rarely the norm.96

As observed,

involuntary returns can actually act as a destabilizing factor which can prompt renewed
tension and violence in the country of origin and lead returnees to flee once again.97
In the era of globalization states are focusing less on the rights of individuals and
more on the needs of national security and protection of state sovereignty. As people
continue to cross borders into lands in which they do not hold citizenship states become
more preoccupied with determining ways to rid their territories of these non-nationals
rather than offer the legal protection and assistance that may be required of them. The
plight of refugees “threatens the entire system that can only be resolved through the
concerted and coordinated efforts of diverse means and agencies.”98 Thus in recent
decades, the value of human security has diminished as national security assumes priority
in state agendas.

The existing state perception is that its national security is a
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precondition for the enjoyment of human security by nationals.99 This has narrowed the
options and possible solutions for refugees, since refugee law has transcended its legal
realm and has crossed into the disciplines of human rights and human security issues.100
The next section will examine the state perspective of refugee law to reveal the
central role that it plays in affording or restricting refugee protection. It will expose how
the state‟s objective perspective is ultimately the deciding factor for the application of the
cessation clause. More importantly, it will demonstrate the need to examine the effects
that it has on voluntary character of repatriation and its current position as a durable
solution. It further substantiates the claim that the act of voluntary repatriation is seldom
based on the refugee‟s independent decision.
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III. THE VALUE OF PERSPECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
As the previous section presented voluntary repatriation as a key component to
the foundation of refugee law the following section will reveal how refugee law is
contingent upon the elements of objectivity and subjectivity from the perspectives of
states and refugees. While many legal instruments are applied preliminarily upon the
subjective perspective of the refugee, the complete interpretation and full application are
based on the state‟s objective perspective, and at times even the state‟s own subjective
perspective. The focus on these two key elements will illustrate the refugee law system‟s
current incoherence and disorder. While these terms together create the framework for
international refugee law, an in-depth examination reveals how the current system allows
the protection of state rights to supersede the protection of refugees. The rights of
refugees are too ambiguously reflected in policy-making allowing states to deter from
legal obligations of refugee protection and distort the understanding and use of central
concepts, such as voluntary repatriation. Beyond the disparities in the legal language, in
its current state, voluntary repatriation cannot be considered a durable solution because of
the sole accommodation for the state‟s objective perspective in policy-making with no
regard for the refugee‟s subjective perspective.
A. Which is it, Subjective or Objective?
Refugee protection is deeply-rooted in the roles of the subjective and objective
perspectives as they are the determining factors in the refugee status determination
process and hence, subsequent right to protection. The subjective perspective refers to an
opinion, assumption or judgment while the objective refers to assumed knowledge or
information from elements which can be seen, observed, touched and is factual.101 The
objective perspective is already pre-conditioned because it suggests a pre-supposition by
the state that because of state powers and sovereignty it is the ultimate entity of the allknowing.

This also proposes that the state, as an outside observer of the refugee

experience, is cognizant of what is truth and reality better than the refugee.
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The question that arises is how does international refugee law differentiate
between a state‟s subjective and objective perspective? The argument presented in this
paper concludes that while there may be a way to distinguish between the two no
attempts have yet been made to do such. Rules and laws are not concrete but rather
intangible concepts which, in determining how to apply them, require a “subjective
process.”102 In the case of international refugee law, the subjective perspective of the
state is treated as the objective. States, based on their own subjective perceptions of the
application of laws and policies, decide when and under which conditions refugee status
is granted and terminated. The current criterion for repatriation objectifies the state‟s
perspective as the essential key to initiate return. It can therefore be argued that the
state‟s subjective perspective is weighted equally with its objective in international
refugee law, with no need to distinguish between the two because in all cases they will be
treated and considered as objective perspectives.

This overarching objectivity

“disenfranchises the refugee through eliminating his or her voice in the process leading to
the decision to deny or terminate protection.”103

The objective perspective further

eliminates the refugee voice by “substitut[ing] the subjective perception of the State
authorities for the experience of the refugee.”104 This discredits the refugee‟s subjective
perspective which is dangerous as it reduces the likelihood of attaining protection.
It is important to consider the difficulties in testing the objective perspective with
the current framework of refugee law and guidelines for voluntary repatriation, or lack
thereof. While the refugee‟s subjective assessment of the necessity of protection is
proved to be well-founded after an objective assessment of credibility and plausibility,
there is a lack of clarity as to just how to evaluate such an assessment. States are thus left
with the liberty to “devise their own, and at times unduly restrictive, standards of
assessment.”105 This freedom of decision greatly debilitates the integrity of the system
and creates an extreme degree of injustice within the refugee regime.
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1. The Objective and Subjective in the 1951 Convention
First alluded to in the refugee definition of Article 1 in the 1951 Convention, the
subjective perspective is based on the validity of fear that a refugee perceives to threaten
his existence and which causes him to flee his country of origin. While the asylumseeker may be able to judge his personal well-being and aspects of this fear, this alone is
insufficient to warrant the right to protection. In order to qualify for protection this fear
is scrutinized by the legal framework of refugee law to evaluate and determine if an
objective element is attached to this fear. The current system mandates that this fear is
only legally recognized and entitled to protection if there is a standard of proof to validate
the claim of fear, based on the objective concept of well-founded, as further outlined in
Article 1: hard evidence that this fear of persecution is based on one of the five objective
grounds.106 While the subjective fear may be the motive to seek protection it is not the
fear alone which grants protection if it is unaccompanied by the objective risk of
persecution.
The cessation clauses outlined in Article 1(C) also highlight the importance of the
objective and subjective perspectives. Paragraphs 1 through 4, illustrate the subjective
perspective through the refugee‟s self-assessment of the home state and results in the
cessation of refugee status when he voluntarily re-avails himself to the protection of his
home state: through means of return, re-acquired nationality, acquisition of a new
nationality or voluntary re-establishment in the home country. Paragraphs 5 and 6,
however, allude to the objective aspect of cessation clauses, based upon decision by the
host state, where the refugee
can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to
exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of
the country of his nationality; (6) Being a person who has
no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee
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have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his
former habitual residence.107
Articles 12 through 30 of the 1951 Convention outline numerous refugee rights
(housing, employment, freedom of movement, for example) during the duration of their
stay in the state of refuge. The majority of these articles call for the Contracting Parties
“to accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals.” 108 The application
of such rights, in all cases, is based on the state‟s subjective and objective perspective.
While the state has the legal obligation to afford such rights, many signatory states have
made reservations to these particular rights. Even those states that have not made any
reservations often create situations where refugees are unable to access such services
easily; they subjectively perceive that refugees do not deserve access to such state
benefits or objectively exemplify that they are unable to provide such services.
Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention also rely on the subjectivity and
objectivity of the state in regards to the acts of expulsion and non-refoulement.
Contracting states are prohibited from expelling a refugee “save on grounds of national
security of public order” and are further prohibited from acts of refoulement unless the
refugee is perceived to be a “danger to the security of the country [or who has] been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime [and] constitutes a danger to
the community of that [host] country.”109 These are based on the perspective of the state
of refuge due to the fact that there is no shared definition of such crimes and danger
amongst states nor are they defined in the 1951 Convention. States are therefore left to
their own restrictive interpretations, with the capability to validate them either
subjectively or objectively, as to when and how such services and rights are offered to the
refugees‟ under their protection.110

107

Id. at art. 1(C).
Id.
109
Id. at art. 32 and 33.
110
No given definition of “persecution” is provided in the 1951 Convention. States are therefore, left to
their own interpretations of “persecution”. In the United States, for example, the “courts have held that
mere harassment or discrimination and generalized conditions of violence do not constitute persecution.”
Holly Buchanan, Fleeing the Drug War Next Door: Drug-related Violence as a Basis for Refugee
Protection for Mexican Asylum-Seekers, 27 MERKOURIOUS CRIM. JUST. AND HUM. RTS. 40 (2010),
available at
http://www.merkourios.org/index.php/mj/article/viewFile/21/25.
108

28

2. The Objective and Subjective in the African Context
The 1969 OAU Convention is credited for having extended the scope of the
refugee definition from that defined in the 1951 Convention. The OAU Convention has
become one of the world‟s most “flexible and innovative refugee instruments”111 Its
expansion of the refugee clearly includes any who fit the present definition as well as
those who,
Owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in
either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside
his country of origin or nationality.112
Even with the expansion of the definition in an apparent attempt to “Africanize” this legal
instrument, so as to meet the needs of the crises in Africa, the context in which it is
written is based in the objective perspective of the state.113 While the first part of the
definition, as replicated from the 1951 Convention, retains the subjective-objective
perspective, the second part, which extends its scope, is based solely in the objective with
its four additional causes of flight: external aggression, occupation, foreign domination,
and events seriously disturbing public order. The refugee‟s asylum claim is therefore not
based on a subjective perspective to fulfill this extended definition but rather “an
objective assessment of whether a factual situation discloses the existence of
persecution.”114 Therefore, this broader refugee definition still relies primarily on the
objective perspective of UNHCR and states.
Unlike the numerous articles in the 1951 Convention, the 1969 OAU Convention
consists of only sixteen articles, the first six of which pertain specifically to refugees and
the relationship between states and refugees. It does not present that rights, such as the
right to employment or education, must be bestowed upon the refugees. However, its
content does include the use of vague and ambiguous language as found in the 1951
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Convention. While Article 1 of the 1969 Convention is considered to be the principle
article of the Convention, due to its broadened scope of the refugee definition, it is
important to note Article 2(4) which elucidates on the process states must take when they
are unable to grant asylum:
Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to
grant asylum to refugees, such Member State may appeal
directly to other Member States and through the OAU, and
such other Member States shall in the spirit of African
solidarity and international cooperation take appropriate
measures to lighten the burden of the Member State
granting asylum.115
While the 1951 Convention does not possess such a concept, the ability for African states
to use this article, on an objective basis, to deter from affording refugee protection only
proves to further destabilize the overall refugee regime.
3. Case Examples
In many cases, there seems to be an apparent “objective trump”116 over the
subjective assessment of the refugee claim. In the case of Maria Beatriz Maldonado
Vega,117 the subjectivity of her asylum claim was not questioned but rather “trumped” by
the objective perspective based on the grounds that her “concerns were „exaggerated‟.”118
This case demonstrates the “accepted view that subjective fear „must and can be assessed
objectively‟.”119 Asylum cases, such those claimed in the United States by Mexican
asylum-seekers who have crossed the border, have also faced this higher objective
threshold. Many claimants affected by Mexico‟s drug war have difficulties proving that
their fear is well-founded and linked to one of the five Convention grounds.120 There are
also claims which are denied because the individual did not seek asylum in a timely
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manner thus resulting in the application of “an objective evaluation of credibility [and]
not to the assessment of a subjective fear.”121
Another example is illustrated in the cases of Haitians fleeing, for various reasons,
to the U.S. by boat in the 1990s. The U.S. Coast Guard intercepted these boats and
forced their return to Haiti without even allowing the Haitians to seek refuge, not only in
the U.S. but in other Caribbean islands as well. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that
this forced return by the Coast Guard was not illegal122 and thus demonstrated the
subjective assessment by the US government and their concerns for such persons entering
the U.S. with the perspective that they were all economic migrants rather than asylumseekers. UNHCR spoke publicly during this time affirming their concerns over such
restrictive applications of the 1951 Convention‟s Article 33 and court judgments stating,
“The obligation not to return refugees to persecution arises irrespective of whether
governments are acting within or outside their borders.”123 States unfortunately continue
to apply their own restrictive interpretations to refugee law and their policies. “[T]he
convention, like many international and municipal instruments, does not necessarily
pursue its primary purpose at all costs. The purpose of an instrument may instead be
pursued in a limited way, reflecting the accommodation of the differing viewpoints, the
desire for limited achievement of objectives, or the constraints imposed by limited
resources.”124
While these are just a few examples, they help to reveal the lower threshold that is
placed on a state‟s subjective and objective perspective to afford full refugee protection
compared to the higher threshold which must be met by an asylum-seeker‟s claim. The
subjective perspective, while necessary to begin the process of an asylum claim, is not the
determining factor for full-fledged protection. This approach is observed by some as
being flawed because those who have experienced traumatic events “are often unable [to]
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adequately…recall information [and] much less relate it in an articulate manner.”125 It is
further flawed since, as previously mentioned, states are capable of using their own
objective and subjective perspectives to easily negate claimants‟ fears and selfassessment of concerns of loss of life and safety due to their ability to restrictively assess
these cases. The use of ambiguous language and the lack of concrete definitions only
further allows for states to create a higher threshold in determining protection status for
persons of concerned.
B. The Right to Remain: Temporary vs. Permanent
While the right to flee is based on the element of fear and lies within the rights of
the individual, the right to cross the border and remain ultimately lies within the power of
the state and their objective perspective. Refugee protection is gained once these the
subjective and objective elements are fulfilled and remain available to the refugee until
the risk of persecution no longer exists. The individual should then voluntarily re-avail
himself of the protection of his home state, thus releasing the host state from any further
responsibility. This reiterates the notion that refugee protection is only temporary in the
eyes of refugee law and states. The granting of asylum by host states is “made
conditional upon an understanding that it would not lead to a long-term presence.”126
Once the duration of the risk of persecution ends it is presupposed that they will return
home and the home state will assume guardianship of these individuals and provide them
with their rights.127
While there is no indication or duration of time assigned to this concept of
temporary stay there is a clear emphasis on minimizing the time in which refugees spend
outside of their own state and in that of the state of refuge.128 There are many factors
which substantiate the inability for permanent admission. The national legislation laws
of many host states illustrate the inability to receive such status as the majority of
refugees would find the requirements to acquire citizenship unattainable. The restricted
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rights and services offered, usually none of which reflect the rights afforded to citizens of
the said state, solidify a state‟s unwillingness to accept refugees on a permanent basis.
Work and educational opportunities, which would normally help to facilitate such
possibilities, are rarely presented to refugees. This lack of assistance exemplifies the
impossibility of integration as a durable solution because again, refugees are considered
guests in host states until the risk of persecution no longer exist in which case the
“friendly” guest relationship concludes.
There is an intrinsic link between the theory of voluntary repatriation and the
objective element of refugee law as the refugee status definition is linked “to neither
humanitarian need [or] respect for human rights, but rather an an individuated
examination of fear in relation to objective conditions [so that] only truly exceptional
claimants ought to benefit from international protection.”129

Refugee protection is

inherently dictated by the objective perspective of the state and based on its
characterization of protection and safety. For example, refugees who flee from certain
states may face a higher objective threshold, dependent upon the human rights records of
the home state, and thus have greater difficulties in establishing the well-founded element
of their fear.130 This factor alone reveals the invaluable weight placed on the objective
perspective of that fear and the lesser importance of the individual‟s subjective fear. This
objectivity affirms the right to refugee protection and when the state no longer recognizes
this element, refugees are “urged” to repatriate.
As the “cornerstone of international protection with respect to the return of
refugees,”131 voluntary repatriation is grounded in the notion of being a durable solution.
Refugees are thus granted the right to make the decision to return, based on their own
free will after being well-informed of the situation in the home state. It can therefore be
assumed that the idea of “voluntariness” is the necessary prerequisite for voluntary
repatriation, based on the subjective perspective and ultimately “choice” to return, which
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“overshadows the objective one relating to the situation in the country of origin.”132
Unfortunately, this notion works more in theory than in actual practice as the objectivity
of state perspectives often overshadows the subjective element of fear and concerns for
returning home. The concept of voluntariness is nothing more than a “moralistic” label
given to repatriation to protect state actions and is more in name that in actual meaning.
The real issue lies with the shifting of boundaries from voluntariness, which
equates to an individual‟s subjective choice, to an objective element where the wellfounded fear no longer exists and thus refugees must return, whether they so desire to or
not. This has diverted the refugee‟s authority to make an informed decision to return to a
decision that is led by an “institutional and state-based direction.”133 Determination
factors for return have shifted, now based solely on objective factors, rather than a
combination of both objective and subjective, ultimately undermining the validity of the
voluntariness of repatriation.
C. The Cessation Clause and Involuntary Repatriation
The 1951 Convention‟s cessation clause allows for involuntary repatriation to
occur under specific circumstances, normally resulting from changed circumstances in
the country of origin.134

The unmistakable linkage between refugee status and the

cessation clause “and the elimination of the factual basis for a well-founded fear of
persecution…is simply too tight and too obvious.”135

The termination of refugee

protection that follows “forced” return is only lawful in the realm of international refugee
law when the conditions in the state of origin have met “a standard of human rights
protection that would justify initial denial of protection.”136 This only asserts the need for
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individuals to be screened to determine if anyone has a legitimate and compelling reason
to unwillingly return to their country of origin.137
When the cessation clause is invoked, the burden of proof needed to maintain
refugee status affirms that the subjective element of fear has no grounds in the current
system of refugee law.

It is this “objectivistic interpretation of the cessation

clause…which permits the argument that it is for the state alone to decide when there has
been a sufficient change in the circumstances in the country of origin.”138 Furthermore,
cessation clauses in the cases of re-entrustment allow the
authorities to deduce from his behaviour the lack of the
subjective element of fear. By this presumption the burden
of going forward with evidence is transferred to the asylee.
It is up to him to produce evidence to the contrary. He
bears the onus of demonstrating that he is objectively
unable to benefit from protection in his country of origin
and thus continues to be a refugee.139
It is important to consider the fact that the commencement of repatriation
programs or spontaneous return by refugees does not warrant denial of refugee status to
new asylum-seekers. Nor does it imply that the conditions in the country of origin have
satisfactorily improved enough to require the application of the cessation clause. 140 It is
important that states continue to adhere to the legal protection standards that are afforded
to refugees.
As briefly discussed earlier, UNHCR has observed the need to, at times, invoke
the cessation clause, due to the lack of alternative solutions to offer refugees other than to
repatriate to the country of origin.141 The voluntary repatriation programs which are
promoted and facilitated by UNHCR occur at times which would pertain to a lower
threshold than that which is needed for the application of a cessation clause.
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indicator of this fact is that the invocation of a cessation clause has, in practice, been
implemented after the conclusion of a voluntary operation.142
D. Is There Really a Difference?
While voluntary repatriation is promoted as the ideal solution for concluding
refugee protection the current blurring of distinction between involuntary and voluntary
has led to a complete breakdown of international refugee law. The voluntariness of
repatriation remains a concrete international safeguard in that it frees states from
committing acts of forced return.

It also equates to refugees wanting to go home

although, in the instances where there is no desire to return, little attention is given to the
refugee agency.143 Involuntary return is also embedded in the objective element of a
well-founded fear of persecution because unless there is a substantiated fear and an
unwillingness to return, refugees will in fact be forced to go back home. The refugee
regime, specifically states, honor the significance and authority of subjectivity when it
“translates into the spontaneous return of the refugee [but neglect this subjectivity] when
it involves a decision to stay.”144

As mentioned, the state‟s proponents for return

adequately substitute the “objective change of circumstances for the refugee‟s subjective
assessment.”145 If the meaning of involuntary is also grounded in the well-founded fear
of persecution then in actuality the current practice of voluntary repatriation is conducted
in ambiguous terms and at times through unethical method in which case we can no
longer make a distinction between the two.
Voluntary return is not truly a choice based on free will but rather mandated by
the structure of the current refugee system. The voluntariness of repatriation seems to be
a humanitarian characteristic artificially imposed on the concept of repatriation so that
returns are not considered forced and states are not accused of acts of refoulement. As
already stated, UNHCR can invoke the cessation clause due to a lack of viable options.
Such actions should be considered involuntary when refugees are forced to return
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because no other possible solutions are available. The concept thus releases states from
any legal repercussions for the termination of their protection and responsibility for the
refugees. For refugees, there is no option for refusal to voluntarily repatriate. Whether
one chooses to repatriate or not, a decision to remain will only result, eventually, in a
forced return home.
E. Who Decides Where Home Is?
It is the primary responsibility of countries of origin to create conditions within
their territories which are conducive to the return of their nationals, keeping in line with
the concept of repatriation as a durable solution. It is then primarily the host state‟s duty
to determine when these conditions are to a certain standard that would both enable and
justify return. From the onset of refugee protection a relationship between the refugee‟s
subjective and the state‟s objective perspective is created since it is the combination of
these two elements which award refugee status. Although, it is the host state‟s objective
and subjective perspectives which are the determining factors in the continual assessment
of possible termination, and underlying temporary element, of refugee status. It is when
refugees do not wish to voluntarily repatriate that this dual-relationship between the
subjectivity of the refugee and the objectivity of the state ends. In situations such as
these, the cessation of protection relies solely on the state perspectives if the conditions
have improved and the subjective perspective of the refugee if he will re-avail himself to
the protection of his home state by voluntarily returning home. The facilitation of
repatriation programs are based on these objective conditions as predetermined by host
states and other agencies.146
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While refugees are offered the chance to voluntarily repatriate home it is in the
hands of the state to decide where home is as there is no legal concept of home; return
equates to the country of origin but not necessarily the home and/or area of land from
which they fled.

“Home is essentially a subjective phenomenon, it is not easily

quantifiable, and consequently the value of a home to its occupiers is not readily
susceptible to legal proof.”147 One aspect of this is explained further through the already
mentioned concepts of temporary and permanent.

Host states deny basic rights to

refugees which would enable their integration into local communities. This automatically
limits refugees from choosing host states as “home.” The other aspect of this stems from
the objective perspective of the state. The state views home as the legal concept of a state
and its citizens, with an “abstract conception of national belonging, and its overarching
emphasis on homogenous group political identity within bounded territories.”148 States
view this definition of home as the “key to stability and international security.”149
Furthermore, there is an “implicit assumption [by states] of a previously existing
relationship between [the] territorial entity, political nation and refugee-citizen”150 which
may not have existed prior to the events which caused the individual refugee to flee.
In most cases, refugees are unable to return to their actual home due to the
destruction that results from civil conflict. Many homes and villages are destroyed and
certain areas may still be considered unstable and dangerous for returnees; for others the
psychological trauma of truly returning “home” is too much to bear. While states view
home in terms of borders, rights and responsibilities, refugees perceive home as being a
particular physical location with a community of shared traits or beliefs. For many
cultures there is an “inextricable link relationship between [the] homogenous group and
the land as the basis of home.”151 Return does not necessary “return” the returnee to the
life that he once had; it cannot be recreated to what it was prior to the events which led
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the individual to flee. Home often becomes a distorted memory over time and results in a
feeling of nostalgia for home without an actual desire to return.
What is thus missing from this negotiation of refugee/citizen exchange between
the host state and home state is the refugee agency as a participatory actor. Refugees are
perceived to be incapable of processing their refugee experience and consequently unable
to exert any power of the circumstances from which they flee, to which they find
themselves in (in the host state) and finally to which they return. The states, through their
subjective and objective perspective, determine and establish the terms and conditions
under which refugees arrive, stay and leave. The refugee agency or voice is negated as
the system revolves solely around the state‟s perspective and excludes the refugee‟s
subjective perspective.

While they may seemingly be granted the right to decide

whether to return or not there is no true decision-making process when either decision
will ultimately result in the return to the state of origin.
Some argue that the lack of progress with voluntary repatriation lies in the
inability to yet provide returnees with the “basic requirements for return, that is, physical
safety and the restoration of national protection.”152 This argument alone reflects only
one aspect of what it means to return home. More importantly, the current system of
refugee law neglects the human element to voluntary repatriation. The current solution as
being a “mere insertion in a country”153 is in actuality secondary to the needs and desires
of the refugees. They do not want to just return home but they want to be home with the
ability to be self-sufficient, no longer depending on humanitarian assistance to support
them.
It is the refugee‟s voice, their subjective perspective, which ultimately secures the
renewed link between the state and refugee. Returnees also want to feel as though they
are a part of the political, social, economic and cultural aspects of home and to feel as
though they are a participant in the re-building and development phases of home. These
factors can only be based on the refugee‟s own personal assessment and cannot be
dictated by any state perspective or state implemented policy. Currently, the refugee‟s
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subjective perspective of fear is not considered to be a part of the “willingness to return”
notion. Many of these subjective fears are grounded in material safety of returnees,
“which includes means of survival and basic services:”154 concerns for safety, home,
access to health care, education and clean and safe drinking water, infrastructure and the
capacity for self-sustainability.

Current practice shows that the offered material

conditions are minimal to promote return and that there is a tremendous gap between
voluntary repatriation as a durable solution and the refugee experience. 155 Unfortunately,
such human rights standards do not currently address many of these concerns which are
specific to refugee circumstances. States of refuge therefore release their responsibility
of such securities, either in providing or ensuring that such securities are provided in the
home state, and “encourage” their return.
F. A Return in Safety and Dignity
The repatriation discourse has recently changed from the concept of voluntary
repatriation to the consideration of the idea of “return in safety and dignity.” Return in
safety and dignity is an approach recommended by those in the field who have
recognized the crisis in refugee law and the challenges in the legal framework of
voluntary repatriation, with all of its gaps, ambiguities and misconceptions. While it too
provides obstacles it may illustrate the willingness to confront this crisis and attempt to
diminish some of the current problems.
Return in safety is the process of return which “takes place under conditions of
legal safety, physical security and material security.”156 The notion of return in dignity is
more ambiguous than its counterpart but refers to the idea that “refugees are not
manhandled; [they] can return unconditionally and if they are returning spontaneously
they can do so at their own pace; not arbitrarily separated from family members; and
treated with respect and full acceptance by their national authorities, including the full
restoration of their rights.”157 This approach situates the notion of safety “within a
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paradigm of „dignified return‟ as opposed to one of external objective assessment: by
providing refugee groups with the political space in which to shape some of the
conditions of their return to country of origin.” Safety is then transformed from the
current condition as state-led objective assessment to a subjective-assessment evaluated
by the refugee.
While there are still gaps in this suggested approach, such as blurring the legal
standards of voluntary repatriation, the portrayal of “untheorised concept[s] of home” and
a failure to require substantial changes in the home before promoting repatriation,158
some suggest that it offers more meaning to the concept of return than the current
definition of voluntary repatriation.159 A return in safety and dignity focuses more on the
return to local areas of origin since it eliminates the concept of political identity and
belonging and the inextricable link of the nation-state and territorial boundaries. The
strategy of a dignified return allows refugees “to shape some of the conditions of their
return to country of origin” and creates the aspect of safety as a “refugee-led subjective
assessment” rather than state-based decision-making.160

It would allow refugees to

decide upon the conditions and the timing of the return. Not only would it mean a safe
return but it would prevent forced returns.161
G. Conclusion
This discussion offers the subjective and objective perspectives as the true
building-blocks of the entire refugee protection regime.

These concepts not only

determine when protection is granted but also when protection concludes. As legal
instruments and case law have shown there has been a shift towards “objectivism in
interpreting the definition of refugee and the cessation clause contained in the 1951
Convention.”162 The existence of the subjective perspective in international refugee law
158
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has, in most cases, become secondary to the objective element.163 While the current
system functions on the basis of these two notions the examination of their role in refugee
protection shows the instability of the system. The ambiguities that result from their
understanding and application only further destabilize the refugee system in view of the
fact that other aspects of refugee law are also pre-determined by these facets.
The legal concept of voluntariness, while a precondition to repatriation, is abstract
and vague as the current system allows it to be “overridden by the objective conditions
prevailing in the country of origin.”164

The discrepancy between the current legal

definition and implementation only creates further ambiguity to its relevance in today‟s
refugee context.

Voluntary repatriation is no longer an integral part of the system

because its primary objective has become more of a political negotiation between the
state and the refugee rather than an individual‟s choice. This has led to the disintegration
of the distinction between involuntary and voluntary repatriation. It has assumed a role
in practice that it was initially created to prevent; voluntariness was an added component
to repatriation in order to prevent forced return now it only further enables it under a
humanitarian guise. While international refugee law may evolve around the protection of
refugees, the underlying truth is that it was created “to protect national interests, not
defend humanitarian principles”165 and thus could never result in the human right to
return or to stay based on an individual‟s choice.
The lack of empirical research on voluntary repatriation only further obscures it as
a durable solution since it allows state assumptions to develop policies and initiate
action.166 The fact that not all refugees want to go home, and those that do require a
different set of objectives and standards to which they will return rather than those which
have been created for them and dictate their return, further delegitimizes voluntary
repatriation. Refugees should be the primary actors in the contemporary practice of
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voluntary repatriation and as a result should determine “the modalities of movement and
the conditions reception.”167
The following section exhibits one source of empirical research as the narratives
provide the voice of the refugee experience from repatriated Liberian refugees. Their
voices substantiate the need for the standard of voluntary repatriation to rely heavily on
the subjective perspective of the refugee. Refugees, in maintaining the integrity of
voluntary repatriation, should have the right to “apply their own criteria to their situation
in exile and to conditions in their homeland and will return home if is safe and better by
their standards.”168 The existing criteria for repatriation no longer address the needs of
today‟s refugees, as the experiences of Liberian returnees confirm, as many choose this
durable solution because of external pressures and, in reality, because there are no other
viable alternatives. While voluntary repatriation is non-binding its counterpart nonrefoulement is a legally binding-standard to which states are clearly not adhering to by
enforcing “voluntary” returns. These actions affect the entire legitimacy of the refugee
law system and its sustainability.
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IV. A CASE STUDY OF FORMER LIBERIAN REFUGEES FROM GHANA
“What stamps the refugee as a man apart, justifying his classifications in a specific social category, is his
inferiority; he is inferior both to the citizens of the country which gives him shelter and all the other
foreigners, not refugees, living in that country.”
- Jacques Vernant169

The previous section outlined the role that voluntary repatriation plays under the
umbrella the objective and subjective perspective in the international refugee law regime.
Although its role has been central to this system, a closer examination of voluntary
repatriation in practice, based on these two perspectives, questions this centrality. As we
have seen, many refugee situations are no longer temporary, and unfortunately, refugees
have become victims of the outdated 1950s legal framework. The narratives presented in
this chapter challenge the standard voluntary repatriation and unsettle its status as a
durable solution for modern-day refugees; refugees who no longer fit within the scope of
the 1950s refugee law arena. They provide agency to the returnees as they express their
experiences during their time of asylum in Ghana and the determining factors which led
to the decision to return to Liberia.

Their subjective perspective demonstrates the

importance of providing a forum to voice the concerns, questions and suggestions of the
refugees.
A. Methodology
1. Purpose and Goal of Research
The purpose of this research is to address the lack of accountability for
repatriation which does not always occur under voluntary conditions.

This study

identifies some acts of coercion that host states commit as a means to influence refugees‟
decision to repatriate and in effect, undermine the concept of voluntary repatriation.
Through the identification of these acts the aim is to demonstrate the difference between
a voluntary decision to repatriate (a decision based solely on the individual‟s choice) and
a decision to repatriate that is a result of direct or indirect coercion. It also aspires to shed
light on the subjective perspective of refugees, giving an authoritative voice to such
169
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disadvantages and marginalized groups which, as thoroughly discussed, are not
acknowledged in the policy-making process. From such research this we will have a
greater capability to recognize the influence of a state‟s objective perspective over
refugee situations and ways in which they commit acts of refoulement under the auspices
of voluntary repatriation. This research and the concluding policy recommendations seek
to influence and demonstrate the need for a more concrete and legal framework in respect
to voluntary repatriation and for state adherence to international refugee law and human
rights norms.
2. Necessity for Liberian Case Study
Very little literature currently exists on the topic of the “involuntariness” of
voluntary repatriation and what is written fails to include the refugee voice. Furthermore,
there has been little investigation into the types and varying degrees of coercion that
governments use to encourage repatriation. The majority of information is based on
reports by UNHCR, host countries and other refugee organizations, rather than first-hand
accounts and studies that include detailed information from individual refugee
perspectives. There are a few cases studies on refugees who currently reside in a camp
and face hostilities from host governments as a means to “force” their return home but
none on returnees and their experiences with voluntary repatriation.170
This case study aims to provide the opportunity to fill the current void of
knowledge and information in refugee law pertaining to the refugee‟s subjective
perspective of their experiences in exile and the process of repatriation. As previously
discussed, in most cases only the objective element is researched and considered but it is
essential to recognize the great importance of the subjective element of the refugee‟s
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perspective.171 Each participant in this case study provides an in-depth look at the
camp‟s atmosphere during the 2008 camp invasion by Ghanaian authorities, how
refugees coped with the situation and a look at the decision-making process on whether to
repatriate or not.

By assessing their subjective perspective, Ghana‟s actions and

treatment of Liberian refugees reveals how they were directly affected by the return
process, thereby demonstrating how Ghana‟s pressures indeed forced refugees to leave its
territory.
3. Importance of the Narrative Inquiry
The narrative inquiry is becoming the leading form of research methodology due
to its emphasis on the subjective perspective and its ability to produce a rich body of
sociological information.

Its method transcends cultures and attaches meaning and

understanding to both individual and group experiences.

The narrative gives us a

“cumulative, multifaceted and panoramic view” of each participant and insight into social
and communal aspects of their life.172 Life histories and personal narratives, such as the
ones documented in this paper, are invaluable tools for conducting research because
many of their advantages cannot always be found in other forms of methodology. They
highlight the concerns, challenges and problems in society, provide ways to discover gaps
in current knowledge, offer empowerment to the vulnerable and marginalized and aid in
restoring agency.173 The narrative challenges current conventional research standards by
obtaining knowledge through the identification and examination of important elements
acquired from the individual perspective in a much larger social context. Through direct
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and powerful ways, the narrative not only affords an opportunity to analyze how people
understand their stories and lives but also gives muted voices and stories, outside the
“normal” realm of understanding, such as refugees, a forum to be heard.
B. Liberia: A Brief History of the Lone Star State
Many say that Liberia is another example of a failed State.174 Whether that is true
or not remains to be seen as the people of Liberia move on from two civil wars and more
than two decades of civil strife in search of their own identity. The Republic of Liberia
inhabits 43,000 square miles, bordering the countries of Guinea, the Ivory Coast and
Sierra Leone.175 The various ethnic groups and its location in this tumultuous region of
West Africa have hindered the success of the Liberian state.
Founded by freed slaves from America, Liberia‟s unique history has been the root
cause for conflict within the country. In 1816, the American Colonization Society (ACS)
was formed by Quakers and slaveholders from Washington, D.C.176 While “the Quakers
opposed slavery, and the slaveholders opposed the freedom of Blacks” they did agree “on
one thing: that Black Americans should be repatriated to Africa.”177

Their union

stemmed from the Quakers‟ ideas that those freed would face better chances of absolute
freedom and as a way to spread Christianity while the slaveholders saw the repatriation to
Africa as a necessary preventative measure to avoid a slave rebellion.178

The first

repatriation program, funded by ACS, began in 1822 with eighty-six volunteers who
landed on present day Cape Montserrado, Liberia.179
The colony was officially recognized as the Republic of Liberia and over the next
forty years more than 19,000 African American repatriates, later known as Americo-
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Liberians, landed on the West African soil.180 While the number of immigrants increased
so did the number of indigenous Africans of the land who were enslaved, creating a
hierarchy of power, similar to that which the freed slaves had themselves fought
against.181 The settlers created their own nation by recreating what they knew from
America; homes, schools and churches were built, resembling the structures found in the
U.S and even established English as the official language.182 Their attempt at “civilizing”
the native population came through the means of intermarriage, enslavement and by
imposing their western ideals and values.183 The state was declared independent in 1847
and Joseph J. Roberts, from Virginia, became Liberia‟s first president. President Roberts
and his government, all American-born individuals, agreed to “create a country based on
the principles of justice and equal rights.”184 However, this agreement never fully took
fruit while “Liberia expanded its borders, [the] government of repatriates located largely
on the coast attempted to establish control over a growing native population located
largely in the interior.”185
Despite its political, economic, and social troubles, Liberia became the model
state for those African colonies struggling to gain independence; it was a founding
member of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.186 Unfortunately,
the gap between the ruling elite and the indigenous populations only increased as time
passed. The majority of Liberians were poor and lacked basic amenities such as safe
water and electricity. During the presidency of William R. Tolbert, Jr., from 1971-1980,
an attempt to liberalize Liberian society and his 1979 proposal to increase the price of
imported rice - a staple food in Liberia - in order to encourage local rice production, only
provided the match for the fire that had been brewing within the country.187 People
gathered to protest against the government and its policies but the demonstrations quickly

180

Id.
Id.
182
supra note 176.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
181

48

grew out of control and turned violent. From that point on the situation in Liberia only
deteriorated.
On 12 April 1980, Samuel Doe, from the Kahn tribe and a Master Sergeant in the
Liberian army, staged a military coup against President Tolbert and the ruling AmericoLiberian elite.188 The coup marked the beginning of more than two decades of internal
conflict. In 1989, Charles Taylor aided in overthrowing President Doe and later became
President of Liberia in August 1997, ending the first civil war.189 The second civil war
began soon after Taylor‟s election as President, due to rebel factions wishing to
overthrow his regime, and lasted until 2003. The fourteen years of conflict left more than
200,000 Liberians dead, created 250,000 refugees and displaced more than 350,000.190
C. Buduburam Refugee Camp in Context
In 1990, UNHCR established the Buduburam Refugee Camp, outside of Accra,
Ghana, to accommodate the influx of Liberian refugees fleeing Liberia after the coup
which ousted Doe. While primarily a haven of refuge for Liberians, the camp also hosted
a number of refugees from Sierra Leone, Cote d‟Ivoire, Togo and various other African
nationalities. At the height of the civil conflicts in West Africa, the camp maintained a
population of more than 40,000 refugees and asylum-seekers. UNHCR initially pulled
out of the camp in 2007 after the declaration of a cease-fire but soon returned after
Charles Taylor‟s instatement as President of Liberia and the quick deterioration in the
country once again. In 2003, the camp was changed to Buduburam Settlement due to the
“improved infrastructure coupled with the fact that it [had] been in existence since
1990.”191
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In 2003, Charles Taylor resigned as Liberia‟s president and a peace agreement
was signed by all the warring factions.192 On 22 September 2004, the governments of
Ghana and Liberia with UNHCR signed the first tripartite agreement. This agreement
outlined the legal framework for the repatriation of Liberian refugees; free choice to
repatriate, the modalities of the repatriation process, etc. This was the third time that
UNHCR had organized a repatriation campaign, after conducting earlier operations in
1991 and 1997.193 This third round of repatriation began in October 2004 and ended on
30 June 2007. The agreement aimed to repatriate 14,000 Liberian refugees but due to
various factors including security concerns, a lack of infrastructure and economic
instability in Liberia,194 only 4,000 voluntarily returned.195 Hesitations to return also
stemmed from those refugees who returned after earlier cease-fires only to have to flee
again due to the resumption of violence. As of 31 December 2007, an official residual
caseload of 75,509 Liberian refugees remained in neighboring West African countries,
specifically Ghana, Cote d‟Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea.196

192

“Fourteen years of conflict and two civil wars left Liberia in shambles with more than 200,000 dead,
250,000 refugees and more than 350,000 displaced” as described in Scott, supra note 190.
193
Center for International Disaster Information, OCHA Situation Report No. 119 on Liberia, (24-30 Sept.
2004), available at http://www.cidi.org/report/8836. See also supra note 191 at 55; “The UNHCR admits
that this failure was a result of not doing its homework properly as people returned to a non-rehabilitated
Liberia with inadequate infrastructure and other essential facilities. Many thus became disillusioned since
there were no follow-ups as to how they could sustain a living back in Liberia. There was also very little
disarmament.
194
Liberians do not have adequate access to clean and safe drinking water as well as access to basic health
care. The Liberia Electricity Corporation only operates on a temporary system to provide limited
electricity while the majority of the country runs on generators or small hydropower plants. Many of the
roads are unusable or are in desperate need of repair. Education facilities are either unavailable or they do
not meet the standard need to host the population sizes. Corruption, fraud and security are still major
threats to the development of the infrastructure in the country. There is a major issue of housing as there is
a lack of housing in Monrovia as it is still not completely safe outside of Monrovia and the unemployment
rate is between 80-85%. Dorsey and Whitney LLP for Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, Liberia is
not ready: A Report of Country Conditions in Liberia and Reasons The United States Should not End
Temporary Protected Status for Liberians, (August 2007) available at
http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyProBonoReport0807Liberia_is_not_Ready.pdf. See also
Dorsey and Whitney LLP for Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, Liberia is not Ready: 2010: A
Report of Country Conditions in Liberia and Reasons the United States Should Extend Deferred Enforced
Departure for Liberians, The Advocates for Human Rights, (2010), available at
http://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/uploads/liberia_is_not_ready_2010_2.pdf.
195
Agblorti, supra note 10 at 6.
196
Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, Appeal for Financial Support for the
Liberian Reintegration Program, available at ww.lrrrc.org/doc/Donor%20Appeal%20for%20Website.pdf.

50

1. Prospects of Integration in Ghana
Ghana visibly opened its doors in the early 1990s to accommodate the large influx
of refugees fleeing the plague of crises that consumed many neighboring West African
countries.

The large reception of refugees at the time proved challenging to the

politically stable state as it had no legislation or policies pertaining to refugees in place at
the time. It was not until 1992 that the state established the Ghana Refugee Board with a
mandate to oversee Ghana‟s refugee populations. The Ghana Refugee Board maintained
“that the government is committed to the integration of refugees locally,” however no
precise policy prescriptions were provided to substantiate its commitment.197
Liberian refugees had the option to either voluntarily repatriate or integrate into
the local host community as possible solutions to their situation. Integration is defined as
“the ability to participate fully in economic, socio-cultural and political spheres in the
host country without relinquishing one‟s ethno-cultural identity and culture.”198
Refugees must be afforded the opportunity to adapt to their host society, through
integration programs, without being required to relinquish their own cultural identity.
The three possible forms for integration in Ghana were:




Naturalization through the Ghana Immigration sector
Citizenship gained by marriage to a Ghanaian national
Acquisition of residence permits or extended stay as a member of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)199
While these three options are legally possible for refugees, in practice, the process
of acquiring citizenship is evidently much more challenging.

Intermarriage is not

common and one requirement of the naturalization process is the ability to speak at least
one of the Ghanaian national languages. Liberians did not have the opportunity to learn
one of the Ghanaian dialects as they existed within their own Liberian community and
only communicated with Ghanaians when necessary, like in the market, for example.
Since the creation of the Ghana Refugee Board there has been no clear evidence
of the state‟s willingness to offer integration into Ghanaian society as a prospective
197
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solution for refugees. Section 14 of the Ghana Refugee Law (PNDC Law 305D) also
outlines the viability for refugees to become naturalized.200 While this law is in place
there are no clearly defined implementation policies or approaches to realize such
naturalization rights. One poster, observed in a refugee camp in Ghana, concerning
integration offered fairly ambiguous details regarding rights of refugees who decided to
integrate.201 Concerns of security issues and the burden of providing resources for these
individuals have both been mentioned as reasons for the lack of the promotion of
integration.202

Public statements by government officials have also clearly shown

Ghana‟s lack of support of integration as a durable solution. In 2008, in response to
demonstrating Liberian refugees, the then-Minister of Interior publicly stated, “[L]et me
once again reiterate that Government has not decided to integrate them [refugees] nor
does it have any intention to do so.”203
The strained relations between refugees and the host state only increased the
hostility between the two entities. The common perception that refugees and nationals
are in competition for resources and aid only further validates claims that integration is
not a possible solution.

With resettlement packages no longer a possibility,204

repatriation remained as the only possible solution.
2. Liberian Women Protest for Improved Repatriation Packages
On 19 February 2008, hundreds of Liberian women organized a sit-in to display
their dissatisfaction with the repatriation package offered by UNHCR and the Ghana
Refugee Board. The repatriation package allotted US$5 to every refugee who returned
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under UNHCR‟s repatriation program and free return to Liberia. The women submitted a
petition to the two agencies, outlining their requests: resettlement in a third country or an
increase from US$5 to US$1000. The women aimed to conduct a peaceful protest, with
only female participants so as not to give the Ghanaian government “an excuse to employ
violent measures against the protesters.”205

The women held banners and signs which

read “Integration? NO! Repatriation plus $1000? YES! YES!”, “Geneva Help US”, and
“Ghana Refugee Board, STOP THE OPPRESSION.”206 These peaceful and non-violent
actions called not only for a better repatriation package but also an end to intimidation by
Ghanaian authorities. There were rumors spreading around the camp at the time that
UNHCR was offering the Ghanaian government US$1500 for every Liberian refugee that
integrated into Ghanaian society. The women advocated for better use of this money by
using it for refugees to return to Liberia and help to rebuild their lives, in a country not
only plagued by civil strife for more than fourteen years but one which many had left
more than a decade ago.
Days after the protests began, the Ghanaian media reported many unfounded
facts: Liberian women were undressing and protesting naked, naked women were running
around the streets and stopping traffic and refugees had attacked a UNHCR and Ghana
Refugee Board delegation to the camp. These statements only enhanced the animosity of
the Ghanaian nationals towards the refugees. In an effort to deter the Liberian women
from protesting further and to calm the rising tensions, UNHCR increased the repatriation
monetary offer from $5 per person to $100 per adult and $50 per child. At the time, “the
secretary to the [Ghana Refugee] board, Abdulai Bawumia, told IRIN news network that
integrating Liberian refugees into Ghanaian society [was] out of the question.”207
The protest continued for weeks before the Ghanaian government deemed the
actions a “contravention of the Public Order Act (Act 491).208 On 17 March 2008, they
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subsequently arrested over six hundred of the peacefully protesting women, including
elderly women, lactating mothers, and even small children who were with their mothers
at the time. The government detained the women for weeks in a remote location.
UNHCR quickly demanded access to these women but while their request was still
pending, in the early morning hours of 22 March, Ghanaian security officials entered the
camp and arrested 107 individuals, the majority of whom were males. They eventually
released seventy-seven of these individuals while fourteen remained in detention facilities
and sixteen were forcefully expelled to Liberia; UNHCR recognized thirteen of these
deported individuals as refugees.209 The security officials claimed to have entered the
camp in order “to arrest a number of identified ringleaders of the demonstrations and
some of the people who posed a threat to the security of the State.”

210

UNHCR urged

Ghanaian officials to “cease any further forcible removal”211 of Liberian refugees,
however in early April, the government deported twenty-three more Liberians. Legal aid
organizations had previously challenged this round of deportation but to no avail. 212 At
the time, UNHCR did successfully secure the release of ninety of the detained women,
including pregnant women and unaccompanied children. The remaining detained women
were all released at a later date.
These events left the refugee camp, with a population around 40,000 at the time,
in a state of fear and chaos. The ensuing turmoil of widespread fear and panic amongst
the camp‟s inhabitants resulted in a mass influx of registration for UNHCR-administered
repatriation program to Liberia.

Liberia‟s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf sent a

government delegation to Ghana in order to find an amicable solution to the
demonstrations and release of those detained. The delegation did express their concerns
209
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over the negative impact that the large returnee population would have on the recovering
Liberian economy.213 A new tripartite agreement was signed between the governments
of Liberia and Ghana and UNHCR.214 Repatriation operations resumed, less than a
month later, on 13 April with adults and children receiving US$100USD and US$50
respectively. Between April 2008 and April 2009, 9,703 recognized Liberian refugees
repatriated215 through UNHCR‟s repatriation program; more than one-third of the camp‟s
recognized Liberian refugee population.216 More than 7,000 of these returnees returned
to Liberia within the first five months of the repatriation program. 217 Less than a year
later the population of the camp was thought to be around 10,000.
As the Liberians left, their empty homes were quickly filled with Ghanaian
citizens. Given the lack of development in Liberia, many Liberians had hoped to attain
some sort of training skills or higher educational opportunities during their time in
Ghana; they wanted to be able to return to Liberia where they could live off of their own
means, no longer having to rely on humanitarian assistance. Even UNHCR‟s established
programs in Liberia, to aid in the facilitation of reintegration, had concluded. They
previously offered skills-training programs (tailoring, computer literacy, baking,
hairdressing, etc.), created shelters for vulnerable returnees and IDPs and offered microloan and grant scheme program. However, these services ended as the UNHCR began
phasing out of its country operations in Liberia.218
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3. Ghana Invokes the Cessation Clause
On 20 March 2008, the Ghanaian government invoked the 1951 Convention‟s
cessation clause, signaling the end of protection assistance for the Liberian refugees
remaining in Ghana. Ghana‟s Minister of Interior stated that the refusal of Liberian
refugees to integrate into the Ghanaian society, after having spent so many years in the
country, was “very insulting”219 and that the detained protesting women would be
“stripped of their refugee status and forcibly deported to Liberia by the end of the
week.”220 He further illustrated his discontent with the refugees‟ “unruly behaviour” and
commented that such behavior created “an anarchic state at the Buduburam settlement”
and led to “grave security implications for the country.”221 The Ghanaian government
therefore thought it was appropriate to enter the camp – on two separate occasions – to
arrest hundreds of innocent and peacefully protesting women and men playing basketball.
Ghana invoked the cessation clause only after authorities invaded Buduburam on
17 March and arrested the protesting women and just two days before their invasion of
the camp and deportation of Liberian males.222 While UNHCR did “hope” that the
government would change their stance on the Liberian situation at Buduburam, there
seemed to be a real breakdown of communication and attempts to facilitate more peaceful
arrangements by all stakeholders did not prove successful. This lack of communication
was mainly observable in the media‟s portrayal of the situation and speeches made by
head Ghanaian government officials. Even refugees within the camp began to divide, as
those involved in the discussions with UNHCR and the Ghana Refugee Board were
thought, by many, to be acting out of their own self-interests rather than for all refugees
of the camp.
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Such invocation of the cessation clause, as previously discussed, allows for
individuals to undergo reconsideration, on an individual basis, before the cessation clause
applies to them. This reaffirms the right to refugee protection by guaranteeing that no
one is at risk of persecution before being forced to return home. 223 The failure to adhere
to such policies and treatment of refugees is a breach of international refugee law. Acts
such as this must be condemned by the international community if we are to ensure the
protection of refugees and if refugee law is to be taken seriously by states as true legal
obligations.
After some external pressures the Ghanaian government finally halted the
deportations in order to “draw up a roadmap to repatriate the 40,000 Liberian
refugees.”224

A UNHCR Global Agenda Update on Ghana reported, “In 2009 the

Government may seek to close Buduburam camp and remove the remaining refugees into
Ghanaian communities.”225 However, more recently, UNHCR, and the governments of
Liberia and Ghana re-examined the concerns for the fate of those Liberian refugees who
have continued to remain in Ghana. The cessation clause, outlined in this agreement,
indicated that if the electoral process, planned to take place in October 2011, is
“successful and peaceful according to international standards” and that a democratic
president and legislative members satisfy the international community then Liberia will
be “declared safe and peaceful.”226 Then “Liberian refugees in Ghana will be left with no
other option rather to opt for repatriation, local integration and left to fight there [sic] own
cause.”227 Regardless of positive political developments in Liberia, Ghana needs to
reaffirm its legal obligations in light of the necessary safeguards in cases of all refugee
nationalities.
4. The Condition of Liberia in 2008
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In 2008, at the time of the Ghanaian government‟s invasion of Buduburam camp, the
situation in Liberia could be considered dire.228 The unemployment rate was at 85% and
80% of population lived below the poverty line.229 The life expectancy at birth was at
41.12, down from 51.8 in 2002. 230 A lack of development five years after the end of the
civil war resulted in only 10.6 Km of paved roadways with no electricity and access to
clean and safe running water.231 An increase in food prices led to an increase in food
insecurity in Monrovia, from 4% up to 8% in just a year and a half.232 It is estimated that
another 40,000 households, or about a quarter of a million people across Monrovia, have
reduced the quality and frequency of their food intake over the past year and a half. 233
Liberia had an external debt of $3 billion USD and UNMIL had, and continues to
maintain, a presence with 15,000 UN peacekeepers in the country.234
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Clearly inadequate attention has been given to both the security of home countries
and the voluntary nature of repatriation by both international aid agencies and policymakers in the realm of refugee law. Some argue that beyond the basic criteria, as
outlined by UNHCR, there must be a close examination of social issues: access to health
care, education, as well as any possible barriers to self-sufficiency. It is evident that the
current conditions for the implementation of voluntary repatriation programs fail to
examine any of these issues or any of the outlined challenges faced in Liberia in 2008.
Furthermore, as previously mentioned the cessation clause should not necessarily apply
to those who have “strong family, social and economic links to the state of refuge.”235 In
many cases, this would prove applicable to the Liberian refugees in Ghana since a large
portion of the Buduburam population had resided there for more than a decade.
It is evident that states do not consider which conditions are suitable for the
individual refugees but rather which conditions create a “good enough” situation for them
to relinquish further protection. It is reasonable to declare, as will be illustrated in the
narratives below, that this objective criterion fails to consider what the individual refugee
deems as essential or important for returning “home,” the subjective perspective of the
refugee. Other factors may be considered important but not vital and thus will not appeal
to a refugee since the home environment is not one which contains the elements to which
they will want to return. In a camp, they have created a home where many of the issues
in their home country are not necessarily problems in the camp, or perhaps not to such a
degree. While there may be an urge to return home, as the following narratives will
illustrate, the reluctance to voluntarily repatriate stems from various political and social
problems as well as a lack of development and basic services available.

These

deficiencies do not enable the individual refugee to return home with the necessities for
re-establishment.
National Transitional Government of Liberia and assist in the implementation of the Agreement. The
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D. The Voices of Former Liberian Refugees
In the refugee context, the term emplacement refers to the transformation of “an
unfamiliar physical space into a personalized, socialized place” with the formation of a
community “through creative action and structural transformation.”236 This is exactly
what Liberian refugees achieved in Buduburam as they transformed an empty field into
their own Liberia. From the preliminary materials they received from UNHCR (tents,
sticks, blankets, etc.) they took it upon themselves to gather money to buy the materials
to create homes out of mud walls and tin roofs. Along with the help of aid organizations
and community-based organizations (CBOs) within the camp they began to recreate
“home” by building schools, movie houses, shops, restaurants, barbershops and even a
few bars. While permanent settlement was not their objective, the idea of not knowing
how long they would be displaced created the need for an existence of a community feel;
a way to move on from the traumatic experiences from which they had fled.
The concept of voluntary repatriation is grounded in the idea that it is the desire of
the individual to go home. In the case of Liberian refugees in Ghana, after a series of
events took place in March 2008, they truly felt as though they had no other choice.
Having spent years in Ghana, Liberian refugees seemed to be waiting for their time,
either to return home or travel to a third country. Ultimately, they were waiting for their
time to finally experience living. Suddenly, this indefinite time was determined for them;
the Ghanaian government‟s refusal to host the refugee population any longer created a
state of fear amongst the refugees. Their fate had been decided without consulting them
but ultimately, many opted to return to their homeland rather than face further abuse or
even death in Ghana. The following narratives will provide an insight into the life of a
Liberian refugee living in Buduburam, Ghana to illustrate the challenges they faced and
their experiences there.
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1. Common Everyday Harassment
Harassment by locals is common for refugees as there is often an “us vs. them”
dynamic caused by misunderstandings and misperceptions of the reasons why refugees
are in the locals‟ own country. For some it originates from the uneasiness of having large
numbers, often in the thousands, of outsiders suddenly in one‟s community while for
others it derives from jealousy and anger because international aid and attention is given
to the specific group of “outsiders.” Harassment and discrimination are also common
from immigration and police officials as they are able to use their authoritative power to
permit and deny entry and regulate movement in the state of asylum. They often abuse
this authority by demanding bribes and at times commit physical and sexual abuse.237
There was no shortage of complaints from the eleven participants who
volunteered to describe their experiences living in Buduburam.

Their Liberian

nationality and status as refugees in the country only added to the misconceptions and
negative attitudes from the host communities, who believed that aid was going to
Liberians when it should have been going to Ghanaians. Their inability to communicate
with the Ghanaians in their local dialect did not ease in their assimilation and left the
majority of refugees vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Liberian refugees were often
used as scapegoats for many of the challenges and problems in Ghana; “Everything that
happens, whether that happens in a different place, they will say that Liberians do it.”238
Ghanaians often accused Liberians of being rebels and of assisting in the civil war in
Cote d‟Ivoire. A large portion of the harassment took place in the Ghanaian market areas
or on public transportation. One participant described his experience in the tro-tro –
common transportation in Ghana – and how Ghanaians in the bus screamed insults at him
about Charles Taylor and how all Liberians are rebels. Another participant described
how she would always have to observe sellers and buyers in the marketplace so that she
would not be charged more than the normal prices just because she was Liberian.
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The majority of participants displayed frustration with UNHCR, composed of
Ghanaian nationals, and other aid organizations and their lack of interest in understanding
the cultural dynamics of Liberians.239 As earlier noted in the portion on Liberia‟s history,
rice is the staple part of a Liberian diet – not corn. Those refugees in Buduburam,
identified as vulnerable individuals, received food rations which included maize; some
Liberians perceived it to be “comparable to animal feed.”240 The individuals would
quickly turn around and sell it to the Ghanaian traders from Accra who “descend[ed] on
the camp only to buy maize grain directly from the beneficiaries.”241 These traders
would then sell it in the Ghanaian markets making a substantial profit while the Liberians
would use their meager earnings to buy rice. So why was rice not distributed to them in
the first place, especially since aid organizations knew about this trading of maize for rice
system? This is one example of the lack of awareness, care and interest that the Liberians
found to be very discouraging. Such inattentiveness left Liberians with the impression
that, from the very beginning of their time in Ghana, the Ghanaian government and host
communities were not interested in helping Liberians. This perception led to even further
resentment and animosity between the refugees and the host state.
2. Access to Education
As in most countries, education is thought to be the framework which shapes an
individual‟s future. Such a belief is shared in West Africa, and was observable in
Buduburam. Many refugee schools were established to provide educational opportunities
for children. There were also training centers, such as baking and sewing schools, to
provide certain skills. The primary educational challenges became noticeable once an
individual completed high school or for those adults who had limited or no education.
The only possibility for higher education was to attend one of the Ghanaian universities
239
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but such opportunities had to be self-financed as no scholarships were offered to refugees
and humanitarian agencies did not provide assistance for such endeavors. Another source
of frustration stemmed from the lack of work opportunities, especially for those with
higher degrees or those who obtained degrees in Ghana. These lack of opportunities
proved to be detrimental to the self-sufficiency of the Liberians and became a source of
further detest for their situation in Ghana.
Almost all participants complained about the higher educational fees required of
them, compared to that of Ghanaian nationals, to attend Ghanaian schools. Many did
what they could in order to attend these schools because of the higher quality of
education compared to the schools established in the camp. Some resorted to selling
water or baked goods while others relied on the generosity of resettled family members
and friends to send them money to pay the school fees.
One young female participant described her experiences attending a Ghanaian
boarding school:
To stay at the boarding house the discrimination was too
much. For me, I couldn‟t come from home and leave my
house every day. So I stayed on the campus but it was
tedious because they call you a lot of names. Sometimes
they call you Liberian 4242 or sometimes they call you
Ashawo which is prostitute [in local Ghanaian dialect].
Sometimes they tell you that you are rebels, that you are
killers and that they can‟t trust you. Sometimes they spit
on your food. Sometimes you go to the bathroom to take a
bath but no one else will enter because you are a
Liberian.243
After completing high school, this participant was fortunately able to afford the
costs of attending a skills-training program.

However, even in this program she

experienced harassment and other setbacks. For example, the books required for such
courses were at a higher cost for her than her Ghanaian colleagues. Even after acquiring
these additional skills she was unable to obtain a job. “Also, you can‟t get a job in
Ghana. I went and applied to so many places but when they see your nationality -you‟re
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a Liberian- they don‟t even consider it. Even if you‟re qualified or even more qualified
they won‟t give it to you because you‟re a Liberian.”244
Another female participant described similar discrimination and harassment while
attending school in Ghana.

She described situations in which the school offered

additional support and classes to Ghanaian students but not to her. There were incidences
where her teacher told her that on certain days there would be no classes when classes
were actually held.245 She also reaffirmed the previous participants‟ inability to secure a
job based on her Liberian nationality. “They will prefer giving their citizens the job. If
you send in maybe your CV and they send in theirs, whether you are qualified or not they
will not give you the job.”246 Due to their inability to secure employment opportunities
or substantial ways to earn a living many resorted to other ways of creating incomegenerating support: selling bags of water, washing clothes or braiding hair in order to
survive. All complained of the need to constantly struggle in order to live and to provide
for their family and friends; refugees in the camp often had to rely on one another for
“small small” money here or food there.
3. Issues with Resettlement
Refugees often face trust issues due to traumatic experiences from events which
led to their departure from their home country, the transit period and while in the host
244
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country. These trust issues can affect relationships with others within the camp as well as
with outsiders, such as locals, government officials and aid agencies. In the case of
Liberian refugees in Ghana, many events created an environment of mistrust between the
refugees and UNHCR, primarily because of UNHCR‟s close relationship with the Ghana
Refugee Board and because UNHCR Ghana‟s employees are primarily Ghanaian
nationals.
Four of the participants relayed stories of Ghanaians traveling to the United
States, on the US resettlement program, but under Liberian names and passports. One
male participant described how his friends found their names on the resettlement board
located at the top of the camp. However, when they went to the airport to leave, names
were called but they saw other groups boarding planes – groups of Ghanaians – going in
place of them.247 Another participant reaffirmed this by stating, “Many days our parents
when they send for us, they go to the airport to receive us and they find another
family.”248 Stories such as these only further “authenticated” the refugees‟ grounds for
distrusting the overseeing refugee agencies. They often felt alone and helpless, forgotten
by the rest of the world, as even those who were supposed to be there to help them did
not.
4. Safety Concerns in Buduburam
Safety can be ambiguous in that it can be composed of various elements
depending on the individual and the culture from which he or she originates.

For

refugees, varying degrees of assistance can amount to security but refugee law‟s general
definition of security is principally established as the right to life, liberty and security of
person.249 One thing that is for certain is that the camp atmosphere should be one which
exhibits all aspects of personal security. Refugees have fled from unsafe conditions and
find refuge in host countries and camps to re-gain this protection and a sense of security.
Refugee camps, however, are often plagued with insecurities: crime, assaults, armed
robberies, rape, and kidnappings, issues with former rebel or government soldiers and
247
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even encounters with former torturers or abusers. Buduburam Refugee Camp was no
different and the majority of refugees faced numerous security issues at one time or
another.
The majority of participants relayed one story or another about the security issues
within the camp. “Joe the Juker”, a Ghanaian man, would walk around the camp late at
night and juke250 the refugees in their homes with a long spear. After this occurred on
many separate occasions a group of Liberians were successful in catching him. They
quickly brought him to the Ghanaian police station at the camp‟s entrance and handed
him over to the authorities. However, like many other incidents involving Ghanaian
nationals, Joe the Juker was released without any further investigations.
In order to address the security concerns of the camp, the Liberian refugees felt it
necessary to “take justice into their own hands” by forming a neighborhood watch
committee.251

There were many documented events which resulted in the death or

serious harm of a Liberian and the Ghanaian involved would always be released. “As
soon as one of the Ghanaians speak Twi252 they free them.”253 Ghanaian police arrested
one Liberian male participant for participating in a fight between him and a Ghanaian
male even though the authorities had been told, by numerous witnesses, that he had not
been involved in the altercation. The police slapped him and placed him in jail. He had
to rely on funds raised by his mother‟s church to retain a lawyer to help appeal his case
and gain release from jail.
The need for Liberians to take action in order to bring some degree of security
and justice to the camp also validates the refugees‟ negative perception of the Ghanaian
government and aid organizations and the necessity to fend for themselves. After a
while, they found it futile to even attempt to report any crimes to the Ghanaian police
who held an office at the camp‟s entrance. Frequent raids and the unwillingness to
prosecute Ghanaian citizens for crimes involving Liberians exhibit the lack of support
and protection on behalf of the host state. Refugees are extremely vulnerable as they are

250

To juke in vernacular Liberian English is the equivalent of to stab in American English.
Participant A2, supra note 238.
252
One of Ghana‟s principal national languages.
253
Interview with Participant D1, in Monrovia, Liberia (January 2011).
251

66

outside of their own country, having fled from violence and often traumatic events, and
are entitled to protection from further insecurities and traumatization. Host states, such
as Ghana, often commit these acts of harassment and intimidation in order to unsettle
refugees, to remind them that they are guests and that their stay is only temporary.
5. The 2002 Camp Invasion
The seven male participants all related their encounter with the Ghanaian army‟s
visit to the camp in early 2002. According to their accounts, the whole camp was
sleeping when, over the loud-speakers, they heard the demand for all male refugees
within the camp to report to the football field, near the entrance of the camp. While the
army surrounded the entire field, the camp‟s male refugees were compelled to wait for
hours, under the hot sun, as they listened to insult after insult from the Ghanaian Interior
Minister Kwamena Bartels. His presence at the camp came soon after the outbreak of
fighting in neighboring Cote d‟Ivoire as the Ghanaian government was suspicious that
Liberian men were crossing the border, into Cote d‟Ivoire, to aid the rebel movement.
Minister Bartels accused the Liberian women of being prostitutes, the men as rebels and
of engaging in armed robberies and the trafficking of drugs.254 On this occasion, the
army beat some men and arrested and detained others. Dogs and guns were used to scare
the 11,000 or so men on the field. In the end, the men spent a total of around ten hours
on the field, without food or water, before being able allowed to return to their homes.
6. The 2008 Camp Invasion
The $5 USD repatriation offer to Liberian refugees was insufficient as it would
not have provided them the means of securing a home, or food or any necessities upon
their arrival in Liberia. The women‟s decision to protest was not to defy or embarrass the
Ghanaian government, but to appeal to UNHCR for more financial support; they wanted
aid that reflected the economic situation in Liberia thus enabling a return with the ability
to re-establish themselves and be self-sustainable in the long-term. The threats and

254

Participant A2, supra note 238.

67

“fallacious and fabricated lies”255 by the Ghanaian media marked just the beginning of
the unraveling relations between the refugees and the host state. The ensuing physical
and emotional abuse, detainment and deportations both shocked and created fear
throughout the refugee community. For many, it was described as a period of retraumatization with the armed security forces entering the camp and treating the refugees
as they pleased. As one participant stated,
I‟ll tell you one thing, some of our colleagues were sent
back to Liberia in boxers. We were living in complete fear
at that time. Some of us were not sleeping at our own place
because we thought where we sleep our houses will be
surrounded and we will be deported or taken to unknown
locations.256
One female participant was one of the 600 women arrested and was detained in
the remote village of Kordiabe for more than a month after actively protesting. Her
detailed narrative addressed her experiences over the course of the month and the
conditions that she was forced to endure. During the time of her arrest, the Ghanaian
authorities physically abused, repeatedly kicked and hit, the women as they forced them
onto one of numerous army trucks that entered the camp on 17 March. In remote
Kordiabe, scorpions and snakes are prominent which resulted in many illnesses and
necessary medical treatments for ailments caused by snakebites and scorpion stings. At
one point the Ghanaian authorities dug holes around the women and threatened that “with
those holes they would just massacre us [the refugee women] and put us there.”257
Armed men kept a close watch on the women, treating the women like prisoners and
escorting them everywhere, even to use the bathroom. It was not until the delegation
from Liberia arrived that these women were allowed to speak to anyone from “the
outside” as many other human rights organizations had been denied access to the women.
But looking at what started to transpire, I mean we were
living in complete fear. Life started to be tedious to us
because we can‟t be in another man‟s country, being
insulted and threatened with armed men surrounding the
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camp. Right? Armed men don‟t enter a refugee camp but
it happened in Ghana.258
One of the male participants arrested on 22 March, while playing basketball on
the court near the camp‟s entrance, was accused of being a rebel and of attempting to
overthrow the Ghanaian government. The security forces placed him in a Moah -a type
of tank- with other Liberians before being brought to a detention facility in the capital of
Accra. During the hours in which he was detained and questioned he was repeatedly
insulted and physically abused with a batu (a baton). He stated that those who did not
have their UNHCR ID cards with them at the time were taken straight to the airport to go
through deportation proceedings; he, fortunately, had his ID with him at the time.
7. The Process Home to Liberia
But you cannot come home when you have kids and you
come home and you live under your friend or you stop with
someone and it will be for a week. When it gets to a month
or two it gets to be boring. So some people had family
members that were waiting to accept them but the majority
didn‟t have, didn‟t have nowhere to go. Some left the rural
area in 1990. They don‟t even know the hut that they left
and whether it still exists. Some left from Monrovia in
1990 or 1995 or so. The house that they left burnt to ashes.
The family or the majority [of them] were killed. It was in
Ghana that they started a family. So the family that you
have started on that side, where will you bring them to
resettle them in Liberia?259
This is just one example of the number of concerns felt by many of those
considering retuning to Liberia after the camp invasion in March 2008. After this
invasion “people started registering and people started going” to Liberia. 260
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chartered planes carried refugees on Sundays and Wednesdays from Accra, Ghana direct
to Monrovia, Liberia. Others traveled by chartered buses –mostly men- from Buduburam
to Monrovia, via Cote d‟Ivoire.
One issue raised during this time period related to UNHCR‟s decision to
fingerprint those refugees with UNHCR identity cards, due to cases of identity fraud.
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Those who failed to go through the process were unable to return through UNHCR‟s
voluntary repatriation program. This was thought to have affected many people because
the procedure took place immediately following after the camp invasion during a time
when many were reluctant to present themselves to any sort of authoritative figure due to
the tension and feelings of uncertainty in the camp.

Others, who did not have

identification cards, were able to secure spots in the repatriation program though bribery:
Because they can‟t go without ID card so some people
bribed. They had a neighborhood watch team who were
over the repatriation with the Ghanaians. So you‟ll go and
you‟ll bribe; you‟ll give the neighborhood watch team
money. When you give them money you can go with that
ID card which is not yours.261
8. Back “Home” in Liberia
UNHCR‟s repatriation programs resumed quickly after the camp invasion and
subsequent arrests. It was an extremely overwhelming and emotional time for all as the
situation in the camp had deteriorated so rapidly that the quick shift from the protests to
the repatriation programs caught many off guard. Within weeks former refugees found
themselves back in Liberia. After signing the repatriation forms with UNHCR, most left
within a matter of days or, in some cases, weeks which left them with very little time to
mentally or financially prepare for their return.262 As one female participant put it,
“Peace in Liberia is another thing but going back home and not having anywhere to start
is another thing.”263 This sentiment exhibits the general feeling for most Liberians as to
why they were not ready to repatriate in the first place.
Only one participant, a female, discussed what it was like for her and her family
back at home in Liberia. She had spent most of her life in Ghana as she fled Liberia
when she was very young. She was hesitant to return with her husband and two children
261
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because she no longer knew Liberia, having spent fifteen years in the camp. At that point
she and her husband had established a life in the camp.264

However, promises of

opportunities for returnees made by UNHCR during the repatriation process gave her
some sense of relief and hope upon their return. Some of these promised opportunities
included skills-training, job sponsorship, educational opportunities and assistance in
obtaining a driver‟s license. However, as she noted, and was later confirmed by a second
participant, “We didn‟t benefit anything from the UN.”265 They tried to pursue all the
opportunities that were promised to her and her family but they did not successfully
obtain anything.
The UN said that if we come back home they will give you
this. If you have a career they will sponsor you. Nothing!
For me, I didn‟t see anything. They said they had a driving
program and we ran after it. Nothing! They said if you are
qualified in this area they will provide some finances and
things for you. We ran behind it. Nothing! They said they
were giving loans but they didn‟t give anything. For me, I
didn‟t see any of it so I don‟t see like it was true. So we
just decided to stay home and just do what we can do until
we can do something for better living.266
While this participant was clearly disappointed and discouraged it did not affect
how she felt about being back home. It was apparent that even with disappointment that
these promises of help and assistance were unfulfilled she was happier to be back in
Liberia and to no longer be in Ghana.“We were in a foreign land and they didn‟t treat us
well. So it is better that I die in my home than to die elsewhere, where I won‟t have a
grave or where nobody will ever know about me.”267 One of the male participants
concluded his narrative by declaring: “It‟s not like you get bread from heaven but at least
you feel safe because you‟re home. You go anywhere you wanna go and nobody will ask
you, „Who are you?‟”268
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These sentiments express the refugees‟ overall thoughts on their time in Ghana
and their happiness to be back in Liberia. While the conditions in Liberia are not ideal,
they are much better than what they had been and are improving. More importantly,
these former refugees feel safe and they feel safe not only because the civil conflict in
their home country has ended but they are no longer in a foreign land where everything
was unattainable and safety was nonexistent.

While home might be an ambiguous

concept, especially in refugee law where many refugees are unable to return to the place
of their former inhabitance, they are in a land with their own laws and customs and are
treated with greater respect in dignity than when they were in Ghana.
E. Narrative Conclusion
Some Liberian refugees lived in the camp for almost two decades.

While

Buduburam had a strong sense of community and developed structures to create a sense
of normalcy in the camp, the time spent was ultimately a waiting game. Some waited for
resettlement opportunities while others waited until it was evident that the security
situation in Liberia had improved and they had opportunities to acquire skills or save
money.269
Voluntary repatriation is based on the idea of “voluntariness;” however, there is
no system to measure the “voluntariness” of decisions to repatriate. There is a lack of
established mechanisms to determine under what conditions refugees are truly making
the decision to repatriate. As one returnee said, “The repatriation was voluntary, sure, but
look because of the tension.”270 The coercive methods used by the Ghanaian government
left Liberian refugees with no other choice but to repatriate.

As one participant

emotionally said, “Living as a refugee is like living in hell with the devil himself;
Especially in Ghana.”271 While Liberians may not have been ready to go home, no
matter what the conditions in Liberia were like they could no longer compare to the
conditions in Ghana, living in fear and wondering who would be victimized next.
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are a list of policy recommendations along with some general
observations and considerations for all stakeholders, not only for the promotion of
repatriation programs but for the entire international refugee law regime. Some provide
methods to address the gaps in the current system, including ways to incorporate the
refugee‟s subjective perspective, while others address the roles and responsibilities of
states and UNHCR. These recommendations do not recognize all the disparities and
challenges of the refugee law system but they offer a starting point from which all actors
can work and build-upon in order to diminish any current problems, inequalities and
irrelevant aspects of its current state.
General Recommendations


International refugee law instruments must consist of a language which has a
clearer “meaning of words” with less room for vague and ambiguous terms so that
there is less freedom for self-interpretation by states.272



UN member states, along with the assistance of UNHCR and other refugee
agencies, must seriously re-consider the 1951 Convention and address the
disparities between its language, its implementation and refugee protection. This
might involve the preservation of the current Convention with major adjustments
or require an entirely new draft. One key element which must be included in this
process is the examination of the scope of the Convention and its limit on
humanitarian aspects, such as human rights.



The current framework for repatriation is unable to achieve its core objective.
There is a need to re-evaluate repatriation in order to clarify its goals.
o The use of language such as promotion, encouragement, coercion,
facilitation and persuasion should all be defined within a legal context.
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As previously mentioned, the current language of refugee law‟s legal framework demonstrate an
inability to distinguish the differences between acts which results in pressure, coercion, encouragement,
persuasion, etc. and under which terms, if any are they acceptable or unacceptable or legal or illegal
actions?
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The meaning of home is also another term which needs to be legally
defined since it differs between the state and the refugee.
o Clear guidelines must be established to outline the role of all stakeholders
in the repatriation process. These guidelines must offer a step-by-step
approach to the various phases of repatriation in order to ensure full
adherence by states and refugee agencies.
o The concept of “voluntariness” needs to assume an absolute legal
character otherwise states will continue to disregard this standard and its
purpose will cease to be of importance. While voluntary repatriation is
currently non-binding, a revision of the 1951 Convention would be able to
incorporate this issue into the draft, in order to encourage states to adhere
to this human rights standard.
o A new approach needs to be taken, with strategic policies, to confront the
issue of the objective vs. subjective perspectives and their role in refugee
protection. The state‟s power over the standards and decisions stemming
from the 1951 Convention has established a system where protection is
not afforded to refugees but rather to states and their self-interests.


The current role of UNHCR and the application of the 1951
Convention have created ambiguity surrounding when mandated
repatriation is indeed legal which must be addressed if repatriation
is to remain a key solution.



There is the need to develop a more effective way to close the gap between the
emergency relief and longer-term development.273 This is of vital importance for
both the home states and the refugees in the state of asylum.



While there is already a discussion surrounding the issue of burden-sharing
amongst states, there is an urgent need to place more emphasis on creating and
implementing policies to address this problem. A solution to this issue could have
immediate positive changes on the refugee system.274
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UNHCR
The 1951 framework of UNHCR does not express the current refugee situation
and has thus only hindered its “adaption process and created a narrow legal image of the
institution‟s potential” by applying “post-cold war legal terms” to “modern-day
situations.” 275 Its current capacity as a political entity is far removed from its original
mandate and thus not only is the UN overextended but its inattentiveness has further
allowed for states to deter from their legal obligations. While there is confusion in the
global community regarding the role and responsibilities of UNHCR there is clearly
disorder and a lack of clarity within the agency itself. This will only prove the agency
ineffective in the long-run if it does not know realize the threshold of its capabilities and
responsibilities. The creation of a new mandate, which reflects the contemporary refugee
and needs, will establish precise objectives, roles and responsibilities.
There is a great need for more empirical research to be conducted on returnees in
order to obtain their voice on the voluntary repatriation experience. Research will allow
UNHCR to gain a greater understanding of the current gaps and challenges associated
with voluntary repatriation. The results from such studies will allow UNHCR to reexamine the current framework of durable solutions and attempt to adapt it to this new
knowledge if it hopes to preserve the refugee law regime. This will also help to reevaluate the current criteria for the improvements in the home country which would
enable repatriation. As this paper illustrated, the requirements that would motivate return
for refugees is very different from those of UNHCR and states. An immediate approach
to facilitate discussions on would also have immediate effects in refugee law, specifically
in the realm of durable solutions.
Another issue which seems to arise is the nationality of UNHCR staff working
with the population of concern.

Already host communities can have difficulties

welcoming and accepting refugee populations. When one is in the position to make
important decisions on behalf of a refugee it is important that they do so in an unbiased
manner. This does not always seem to be the case and is an important issue that seems to
275
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affect UNHCR on a global scale, rather than just country or region specific. It is a matter
which should be examined closely in order to ensure that the objectives and the integrity
of UNHCR are upheld.
Further recommendations include:


The implementation of “education for repatriation” programs in order to teach
refugees about dispute resolution along with skills to later maintain a
livelihood.276



UNHCR should oversee and facilitate voluntary repatriation plans from the
beginning to the end in order to “monitor the fulfillment of [any] amnesties,
guarantees or assurances”277 that were promised to the refugees as part of their
return.278



UNHCR must facilitate dialogues between Northern and Southern states to
address burden-sharing amongst all UN members and the 1951 Convention
signatories and initiate processes and principles related to addressing refugee
situations and how states can mutually assist each other while providing absolute
refugee protection.



UNHCR should coordinate and facilitate national asylum practices for states in
order to create a normative framework for all those who seek asylum.



Assistance, rather than protection, has come to comprise by far the greatest
portion of the UNHCR‟s work. The agency must devise solutions for groups of
people rather than for individual refugees.279

State of Asylum
It is common knowledge that while states may ratify legal instruments they
usually fail to adhere to their obligations and/or successfully implement their policies. As
this paper has demonstrated, the legal instruments of international refugee law are no
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different. While a discussion regarding the need for states to abide by both international
human rights and refugee law is obvious it is also known to have little effect on states.
So while one may not force a state to comply with their obligations it is important for
discourse to revolve around ways in which refugees and states can mutually benefit from
one another during the refugees‟ duration of stay in the host state.

If states fully

understand and recognize the positive effects that granting certain rights to refugees
would create then perhaps they would be more inclined to consider such benefits. By
acknowledging this they would realize that it is in their best-interest to approach refugee
law in a manner which will result in success rather than increased difficulties and
problems.280
States of refuge should also consider the following recommendations:


Access to education, skills development and income-generating activities will
enable refugees to rely less on aid and aid in preparation for their eventual return
to the home state. These opportunities create self-reliance which enables refugees
to rely less on humanitarian and government assistance. They also create the
possibility for generating economic opportunities and development in host
communities.



States should facilitate repatriation along with the help and support of the
UNHCR and other refugee and humanitarian agencies in order to ensure that the
needs and rights of refugees are addressed through every step of the process



States should develop and implement programs or other activities to bring
together refugee and host communities in order to develop friendlier relationships
rather than hostile and/or discriminatory ones. It creates mutual understanding
and also acts as an educational tool for all participants.
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For example, a positive and supportive approach for voluntary repatriation will result in a greater chance
of its durability rather than forced returns which have a greater risk of resulting in renewed refugee flight.
Approaches such as this, and policies which create such situations, are unsustainable and are of even
greater detriment to the refugees as well as the host states.
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State of Origin
The home state has some of the most difficult and challenging responsibilities as
it is the one recovering from civil conflict and, as noted, often lacks basic infrastructure
and services. Their duty to welcome returnees home and re-instate their protection as
citizens can be a burden if returnees attempt or are forced to return too soon after the end
of a conflict. It is essential that states of origin keep agencies, such as UNHCR and other
aid organizations, as well as the asylum states informed on their conditions and progress.
They must also be forthright and clear about their needs and areas where they are facing
difficulties.
Once it has been decided that returnees can successfully return “home” the home
states must be attentive to the needs of returnees in their transitional and recovery plans.
They must work closely with states of refuge to facilitate an easier transition for
returnees. They need to implement strategic policies and plans for the reintegration of
returnees. Home states must assist them in obtaining any necessary documents (birth
certificates, passports, deeds to land, compensation claims, etc.) so that they may begin
re-building their lives.

However, states of origin must be practical when creating

programs or policies, such as the reacquisition of land or property, so that they are fair for
all nationals. They should not make promises that they are unable to keep if they desire
success in the phases of reintegration and national rehabilitation.
Refugees
One of the major gaps in the current organization of refugee law is that the
individual refugee is not considered an integral part of the international refugee regime.
By transforming his role from a passive recipient into more of a participatory position
then he has the ability to aid in some of the burdens that states claim to bear when they
host refugee populations.

This offers power to the individual to make important

decisions for himself to not only better his life but to also realize the options that he has,
rather than waiting around for months or even years for someone to approach him and
offer or mandate solutions. Policies affect refugees directly and thus they should be
involved in all aspects of the decision-making process of the system.
79



From the onset of protection, refugees should have a clear understanding of what
their rights are and assistance offered in camps or urban environments should
offer programs to address this issue.281



Repatriation assistance must not only reflect the refugees‟ criteria but it must also
reflect their pace of decision-making.282



When seriously contemplating repatriation programs refugees should be afforded
the opportunity to address their concerns in an open forum. These concerns
should then be considered by host states and UNHCR who should respond to
these questions and fears.283
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VI. CONCLUSION
Whether you agree or not that international refugee law is in crisis, one cannot
deny that its current framework does not reflect the needs of contemporary refugees. The
current rift in the refugee system and the various gaps in the standards of protection only
substantiate the need for states “to stick to the spirit of international instruments [and]
find a viable solution in an environment [which is becoming] increasingly hostile to
refugees.”284 From burden-sharing to refugee protection to the principle of nonrefoulement states are becoming increasingly absent in the global refugee problem.
While states of the North continuously leave Southern states to bear the challenges of
providing for refugees, the majority of states seek ways to either divert their participation
or to relinquish their assistance all together.
Voluntary repatriation may have been considered the ideal solution for the past
three decades but its increasing transformation from a voluntary character to an
involuntary one illustrates its inability to continue serving as a durable solution without
completely disrupting the refugee protection system once and for all. The current criteria
for the promotion of voluntary repatriation lack a standard of mechanisms which reflect
the needs of refugees and human rights norms; provided with the right support refugees
are the best judges to determine when it is safe to return. The shift of control from legal
standards to the state‟s objective perspective has increased the power of the state to
become the primary decision-maker, creating a disruption in the system. This puts the
safety of refugees in danger, deteriorating its intent to provide protection to vulnerable
individuals. The state‟s objective perspective cannot be the premise for coercing
refugees to return nor can it replace the value of the refugee‟s subjective perspective.
Ignoring the refugee voice increases the likelihood that they will be unable to fulfill the
requirements for refugee protection, which they may otherwise be eligible for, or remain
refugees indefinitely, causing even more “burdens” for host states. The lack of
consideration of the refugee‟s perspective along with the current ability of states to hide
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behind its sovereignty to avoid refugee situations enables states to largely ignore their
obligations to both international refugee law and international human rights law.
Today‟s refugees “are less often middle-class people who need legal assimilation
in a second European culture [for whom the 1951 Convention was created] than destitute
people with a wide variety of special needs.”285 If we are to address the challenges which
stem from this outdated context then we must be willing to negotiate the terms under
which it presently exists. A “fundamental rethinking of norms”286 is necessary to achieve
the objective of refugee law since current practice clearly illustrates that states do not
respect the current approach to legal standards of refugee law. Legal instruments must be
re-developed under a normative framework to reflect human rights standards and use
more restrictive language for less state interpretation. If the system continues to function
in its present capacity then refugees will continue to find themselves in a state of
perpetual fear and eternal limbo and refugee law will remain in turmoil.
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VII. APPENDIX
A.

Methodological Approach

Why a Focus on Former Liberian Refugees?

This particular community was chosen for the case study in order to address the
following:


This particular community has not experienced research fatigue thus information

provided may prove to be new and insightful for future situations where refugees are
at risk of refoulement and acts of hostilities by the host government.


There was very little reported on the camp‟s invasion by Ghanaian security forces

on 17 and 22 March 2008 and the weeks that followed.


Few reports or studies exist on how these events in March 2008 affected the

residents of Buduburam and their situation as refugees in Ghana.


It is important to consider the fact that many Liberian refugees feared for their

lives and believed they were in greater danger if they continued to reside in Ghana
rather than if they were to return to a still unstable Liberia, thus resulting in
“voluntary” repatriation.


This case study offers a prime example of how host countries often have immense

influence on the news which reaches the international media sources. 287


Due to the lack of international press coverage and factual documented accounts

of the situation in Buduburam, the international community never condemned the
Ghanaian government‟s actions.
Methodological Approach

I conducted narratives with 11 former Liberian refugees in the cities of Monrovia
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Most of the information released to the international community was fabricated, focusing mainly on a
report that refugees were protesting naked rather than the motive for the protest in the first place.
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and Buchanan over a 2-week time period in January 2011. The narratives288 included
individuals with various perspectives and experiences: returnees who participated in a
repatriation program both before and after 17 March 2008.

I recruited participants

through former acquaintances from the Buduburam Refugee Camp, known as
“gatekeepers”. Each gatekeeper referred me to a participant who was then able to refer
me to additional participants for the study. By using this “snowball” sampling technique
I mitigated any bias responses by being unacquainted with the participants.289
I conducted informal conversation with each possible participant during the
recruitment process, before selecting participants, in order to determine whether or not it
would be appropriate for the participant to partake in the study.290 Before each narrative
session began, I made certain that each individual had a clear understanding of the project
description as well as the process of narrative inquiry.291 Individuals understood that
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Initially, I planned to conduct a survey but due to the population sample size (Buduburam‟s population at
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appointments as well as a review, with the participant, of their narrative transcript (as described below).
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may have felt more inclined to frame their responses around this context if they thought it would help me
with my research.
290
Another reason for conducting only eleven narratives is that in the recruitment process for participants I
needed time to conduct informal conversations with potential participants, as suggested in the literature
regarding the narrative approach, prior to inviting the participant to participate in the research. Since
participants may be unable to see potential consequences, such as susceptibility to negative mood states and
depression, through these informal conversations I was able to recognize any possible vulnerabilities which
could have led to possible consequences or harm if the participant had participated. While I did not believe
that my topic of research would lead to such consequences I did want to ensure that all safeguards were in
place to prevent any harm to the individual participant. Therefore, I planned that if at any point of the
recruitment process or during the story-telling phase if a situation involving such vulnerability arose I
would contact a professional Psychosocial Worker at the Liberian Association of Psychosocial Services or
another professional if necessary. Fortunately, such a situation did not arise. As mentioned in both the
Smythe and Murray literature and per the suggestion of the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, I
obtained the contacts for these professionals, such as the Liberian Association of Psychosocial Services,
prior to my arrival in Liberia. As described in William E. Smythe and Maureen J. Murray, Owning the
Story: Ethical Considerations in Narrative Research, 10 ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR 313(2000).
291
The participant must have a clear understanding that a narrative is the process through which they tell
their story or their experiences through their own perspective. However, this narration, while told from
their own perspective, will later be re-narrated, from the researcher‟s perspective. As Smythe suggested, I
allowed for time, in this case two days, to pass before conducting the narrative to ensure full consent and
understanding of what the research process entailed and to ensure that the participant told their own story,
with their own words and from their own perspective. Also, individuals understood that no compensation
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participation was on a completely participatory basis with an emphasis on the need for
the individual‟s honesty throughout the narrative process. I retained anonymity by not
recording any personal details, in order to diminish any security concerns that these
former refugees may have as well as to minimize the bias within the study‟s results.292
Furthermore, any participant interested in receiving the results of the study will be given
the opportunity to receive them. All observations and interviews were conducted in a
location of the participants‟ choice to ensure their comfort and safety. 293 I assured each
participant of the importance of confidentiality in this study and presented them with an
informed consent form for their review and signature; the consent forms were not shared
with anyone other than me.294 I reminded participants that at any point throughout the
course of the study if they decided to no longer participate then they had the right to
refrain from participating further and that any information they had provided up to that
point in time would be discarded. Participants were not below the age of twenty-one in
order to ensure that they were legally independent, and not dependents, when they
repatriated to Liberia.295
The Importance of the Narrative Inquiry (Expanded)

The narrative inquiry is essential as the methodological approach to this study
would be awarded for their participation. Id.
It was important that the participant was aware that their identity would not be used in the written
research but that a numbering system, only known to me, would be used in place; any personal and
demographic information that they revealed was not incorporated so as to protect their identity.
Furthermore, those who referred me to the participants were not present at any point of the narrative
process, including the follow-up and review of the transcripts. Id.
293
Only the participant and I were present during the course of the narrative, unless he/she wished to have
someone else present during this time period. No acquaintances were involved in the actual narrative
process.
294
It was highly understood that many participants would be unwilling to sign the form but it was clear that
their oral consent was suffice to participate in the narrative. Only two of the eleven participants refused to
sign the form but did give their oral consent to participation. Furthermore, while the informed consent does
not allow for the course of nature that narratives often take, the participant and I relied on the “process
consent”, which is an on-going understanding of consent that will last through the duration of the narrative
process. Therefore, at any time, either during or after the narrative phase, if the participant felt that the
narrative moved beyond the boundaries from which they were comfortable then they would have been able
to withdraw their participation and data. All data, including the consent forms, will be destroyed at the end
of the 3 year time frame that is required by the IRB. Thomas Hadjistavropoulos and William E. Smythe,
Elements of Risk in Qualitative Research, 11 ETHICS & BEHAVIOR 164 (2010).
295
In order to register for voluntary repatriation an individual had to be of the legal age of 18 in order for his
or her decision to repatriate to be considered legal. Those under the age had to repatriate with their parents,
or other family members, or else did not have the ability to return to Liberia.
292
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because the objective is to understand the subjective element of the refugee experience
through the individual‟s perspective.296 Narratives can be “used to effect cultural change,
transfer complex tacit knowledge trough implicit communication, construct identity, aid
education, contribute to sense making, act as a source of understanding, and study
decision making.”297

Participants are able to talk openly and freely about their

experiences and the events surrounding their repatriation; they are not confined to the
boundaries of particular questions as presented in other forms of methodology. This
allows room for additional information to be provided which may be useful and insightful
and may not have been offered otherwise. The “narrative lends itself to a qualitative
enquiry in order to capture the rich data within stories”298 and are able to “address the
ambiguity, uncertainty, complexity and dynamism of individual, group and
organizational phenomena.”299 Surveys, questionnaires and other types of quantitative
analyses are unable to capture such information.

While the narrative stories “are

essentially individual constructs of human experience and can have limitations that may
affect objectivity,”300 they can offer “different viewpoints and interpret collected data to
identify similarities and differences in experiences and actions.”301
Approach to Conducting Narratives

When conducting narrative inquiries the research participant is regarded as a
collaborator rather than an informant because the researcher does not guide the
participant with the agenda of the research, such as in other methodological approaches.
Instead research is conducted through forms of dialogue between the researcher and the
collaborator (participant) with the research subject as a key participant in the discussion.
I met with each individual twice, for a period of a couple of hours, with time set
aside during the two weeks to allow for additional follow-ups if it was necessary. In
296

Id. The purpose of narrative is not to clarify what the “participants intended to say but, rather, to interpret
the underlying, implicit meanings behind what they say.” Such narratives are known as “typal narratives
because they attempt to subsume individuals and their life experiences within broader types that are of
theoretical interest to social scientists.”
297
M Mitchell and M Egudo, A Review of Narrative Methodology, Australian Government Department of
Defence: Defence Science and Technology Organization, II (November 2003).
298
Id. at 2.
299
Id. at executive summary.
300
Id. at 5.
301
Id.
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order to illicit information and to create a standard across the group I asked the same
questions to each participant. I avoided asking direct questions so that the research
would remain in the narrative format while focusing on the focal point of my research.
By asking indirect and open-ended questions I was able to open up the discussion for the
participant to then begin the process of telling their stories. Examples of questions asked
include:




Tell me about life in Ghana.
Why did you choose to return to Liberia rather than remain in Ghana?
Tell me about the repatriation process.

Data Collection Method

Through the narratives I successfully obtained individual stories and experiences
from returnees and their time prior to and during the decision-making process in which
they decide to repatriate back to Liberia.302 No personal information was recorded and a
letter and number system was created (in place of a pseudonym) to refer to individuals in
the final report.303 After the completion of each narrative, I consulted with the participant
to ensure that their transcript was an accurate reflection of their narration along with a
transcript of my interpretations from their narrative.304 I considered any feedback from
the participant and incorporated it into the data, if it proved to be of vital importance.305
Any recorded data will be destroyed after a three year time period.
B.
Informed Consent Form306
Hello,
302

In order to retain accuracy I used the assistance of an acquaintance when stories contain cultural
elements (expressions, phrases) that I was unfamiliar with. Any of these necessary clarifications were
made at a time separate from the time period of the narrative to ensure the safety and protect the identity of
the participant.
303
Their experiences were hand-written using a numbering system, only known to me, so that only I know
to which participant the number and corresponding information belong. It also assists in the preservation of
anonymity in the unfortunate event that any materials are lost or stolen as there would be no manner of
tracing the information back to the participant.
304
If there was a particular topic of concern then a mutual agreement was made before the information was
changed and thus incorporated into the research, in case the alterations greatly impacted the protection of
the individual, the researcher and the integrity of the research.
305
Smythe et al., supra note 290. This also allows for further protection as the participant has the ability to
give their final consent to their information begin included in the final research.
306
This informed consent form was taken from the CMRS Research and Methodology course that I took
with Dr. Ray Jureidini during the spring semester 2010 and was adapted to fit my research topic.

87

I am a student in the International Human Rights Law Program at the American University in
Cairo. For my thesis research I am conducting a study that seeks to understand the perspective of the
individual refugee during the process of repatriation. The main aim of this study is to understand the
conditions and experiences of Liberian refugees in the repatriation process and the role that the Ghanaian
government played in this processes both prior to and during the process of repatriation. I am asking for
your help and cooperation. I would like to ask you a few questions and listen to your experiences of living
in Ghana and the process of repatriation.
During the course of this study, it is possible that the discussion will move towards a topic that
may be of an upsetting nature. For this reason, you may stop the interview whenever you wish and the
information that you have provided will be withdrawn. Please understand that while you will give your
personal perspective on your experiences, the information will then by re-narrated from my own
perspective. I will allow you to review the transcript of your narrative as well as that of my perspective
before I include it in my research.307 In the final research report all names and demographic information
will be disguised with pseudonyms so that your identity will be protected.
When this study has been completed and is in the form of a written document, it will only be made
available to students and professors at the American University in Cairo. It is also possible that at some
later stage the results of the study may be published, however, no individual will be able to be identified in
that publication, so your anonymity will be preserved.
Thank you for your cooperation.
I have been informed that the records, transcript and/or notes of the interview will be preserved in
a secure place at the American University in Cairo. In this context, I agree to give consent that all of the
information provided by me during this interview can be published. I want my name to be used / kept
confidential in any outcomes of this study.
Date:

307

Smythe et al., supra note 290. Smythe suggests that the researcher warns the participant that through the
course of the narrative the path of the storytelling experience may lead in various directions, including
those which may not have been intended by the participants. It is up to the researcher to use their intuition
and judgment to avoid harm and maintain informed consent throughout the process.
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